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Bank-issued contingent-convertible capital instruments (known colloquially
as "cocos ") are assumed to be a less costly substitutefor common equity that
will improve the stability of banks in a crisis situation. However, cocos are
new and untested instruments. In a futurefinancial crisis they are likely to
incentivize behaviors and trading strategies (notably panic selling short
selling, and the use of credit default swaps) that have the potential to harm
confidence in banks. Without confidence, banks will have difficulty funding
themselves and the likely consequences of bank difficulties (credit crunches
and possible bailouts) will be felt by society at large. This should make
regulatorsexceedingly wary of endorsingthe use of cocos. Indeed, many of the
supposed benefits of using cocos instead of ordinary common equity for
regulatory capital purposes appear to be illusory: to best preserve systemic
stability, regulatory capital requirements should therefore be satisfied with
common equity ratherthan cocos.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In late 2008, in the depths of the Financial Crisis,' blogs and hair
salons were buzzing with talk of complex and esoteric financial
instruments that no one had heard of only a few months earlier. Few
had anticipated that things like "credit default swaps" even existed, let
alone had the potential to have such a significant impact on people who
had no connection to the banking industry.' Now, in the wake of the
Financial Crisis, new types of financial instruments are evolving that
could have equally important ramifications for the lives of everyday
people. One such type of instrument is the bank-issued contingentconvertible capital instrument (known colloquially as a "coco"), which
has started to gain popularity in the last few years. Cocos have not been
tested in any financial crisis and in a future crisis they are likely to
interact with other financial instruments and incentivize trading
strategies in a myriad of complex ways that can destroy confidence in
banks. If these cocos cause significant damage to confidence in banks,
the likely consequences of that damage (credit crunches and possible
bailouts) will be felt by society at large. This should make regulators
exceedingly wary of endorsing the use of cocos.
Simply put, a "coco" is a debt instrument (like a bond) issued by a
bank.' A coco will remain a debt obligation of the bank, unless a
contractually pre-defined (and reasonably unlikely) "trigger event"
occurs.' In that case, the coco will automatically convert into equity
shares in the issuing bank. Banks have become increasingly interested in
cocos because of new international standards, formulated in the wake of
the Financial Crisis, that require banks to hold larger amounts of what is
In this Article, the financial crisis of 2007-08 will be referred to as the
"Financial Crisis."
See, e.g, The Tiuth About the US Economic Crisis and Credit Default Swaps-DerivativesProcesses and Insanity, CRICKETDIANE'S WEBLOG (Sept. 24, 2008, 9:36 AM),
http://cicketdiane.wordpiess.com; Next Crisis: Credit Default Swaps, NoRMxxx RUMINATES
(June 8, 2008, 2:38 PM), http://nornmxxx.blogspot.com; Credit Default Swaps-The
Financial Weapons of Mass Destruction, MEDIA GUERRILLA (June 17, 2008, 4:28 PM),

http://xkorpion.wordpress.com.
' See Thomas A. Fisher, Lehman CDS Auction Should Reveal Winners and Losers, FFS

BLOG (Oct. 10, 2008), http://ffscambridge.con/blog; Steve Sailer, Credit Default
Swaps and Moral Hazard,VDARE (Jan. 2, 2009), http://www.vdare.com/posts.
' See Ceyla Pazarbasioglu et al., Contingent Capital: Economic Rationale and Design

Features4 (Int'l Monetary Fund, Staff Discussion Note No. SDN/11/01,Jan. 25, 2011).
Id.

See id. This is the definition of "cocos" used by the International Monetary Fund
(IMF). It should be noted that this definition is not universally accepted. For
example, as discussed in Part III.C below, the Swiss regulators use the term "coco" to
describe instruments that include a write-down feature (these would not be included
in the definition of "Cocos" used in this Article). Some other commentators are

imprecise and do not make it clear whether or not they consider instruments with a
write-down feature to be cocos.
7Id-
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known as "regulatory capital": cushions of equity and equity-like
instruments that are intended to make banks stronger and better able to
absorb losses and withstand future crises.' But banks do not like to keep
large amounts of equity on their books-they would generally prefer to
fund themselves with debt, which banks view as a cheaper option.9 Some
international and national authorities have taken the view that cocos,
which are hybrid debt-equity instruments, are the best of both worlds:
cocos are thought to be cheaper than equity, but more loss-absorbent
than debt.'o As such, these international and national authorities support
the use of cocos by banks to satisfy some of their regulatory capital
requirements."
However, proponents of cocos have not given sufficiently detailed
consideration to how cocos are likely to interact with other parts of the
financial system in a crisis situation. The novel and distinguishing feature
of cocos is that they contain a contractual mechanism which provides for
automatic and irreversible conversion from debt to equity upon the
occurrence of a trigger event.12 Although the occurrence of a trigger
event is unlikely, if it does occur, the nature of the coco will change
fundamentally (from debt to equity): there is no room for moderation in
the conversion.'3 Markets will therefore look on a potential conversion
with great trepidation-if signs are pointing toward conversion, then
market confidence in the bank that issued the coco is likely to be
damaged. If confidence is damaged, then this will prompt panic selling,
short selling, and the use of credit default swaps (CDSs). These activities

8
Base Camp Basel: Regulators Are Trying to Make Banks Better Equipped Against
Catastrophe, EcoNOMIsT (Jan. 21, 2010), http://www.economist.com/node/15328883
[hereinafter Base Camp BaselJ.
' Anat Admati et al., Fallacies, Irrelevant Facts, and Myths in the Discussion of Capital
Regulation: Why Bank Equity Is Not Expensive, at 39 (Rock Ctr. for Corp. Governance at
Stan. U. Working Paper Series No. 86, Stan. GSB Res. Paper No. 2063, Mar. 23, 2011).
o Thomas A. Humphreys & Anna T. Pinedo, Is It a Bird? A Plane? Exploring
Contingent Capital,BUTrERWORTHSJ. INT'L BANKING & FIN. L., Feb. 2010, at 67.

" See LOUISE PHTr ET AL., GOLDMAN SACHS GLOBAL MKTS. INST., CONTINGENT CAPITAL:
POSSIBIInES, PROBLEMS AND OPPORTUNTES 7 (2011); Gregg Rozansky, The Loss Absorbency
Requirement and "Contingent Capital" Under Basel III, HARv. L. ScH. FORUM ON CORP.
GOVERNANcE
&
FIN.
REG.
(April
24,
2011,
7:45
AM),
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2011/04/24/the-loss-absorbency-requirementand-%E2%80%9Ccontingent-capital%E2%80%9D-under-basel-iii/#5; Swiss FIN. MKT.
SUPERVISORY AUTH. FINMA, ANNUAL REPORT 2010, at 12 (2010); Jane Merriman, SNAP
ANALYSIS-Swiss Give Fresh Momentum to Contingent Bonds, REUTERS FIN. REG. FORUM
http://blogs.reuters.com/financial-regulatoryPM),
2010
10:57
4,
(Oct.
forum/2010/10/04/snap-analysis-swiss-give-fresh-monentum-to-contingent-bonds/.
12 Elizabeth Fournier, CoCo Bonds Could Be One-Off INT'L FIN. L. REv., Dec./Jan. 2010,
at 24, 24; Base Camp Base supra note 8; Note, Distress-ContingentConvertible Bonds: A Proposed
Solution to the Excess Debt Problem, 104 HARv. L. REv. 1857, 1870 (1991); Jennifer Hughes,
'CoCo' TrggerPlan Draws Wary Response, FT.COM (April 4, 2011 6:12PM), http://www.ft.com
/cms/s/0/1936ad78-5edb-1 IeO-a2d7-00144feab49a.html#axzzlaRcAlwAq.
" Fournier, supranote 12, at 24; Note, supra note 12, at 1870; Hughes, supra note 12.
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will further damage confidence in the bank in a pernicious feedback
loop. In short, cocos have the potential to drive the markets cuckoo.
Imagine a hypothetical large bank-Sonny Bank-that decides it
wants to issue cocos. Sonny Bank does this because new regulations have
just been made that require it to hold more regulatory capital, and those
regulations stipulate that some of that regulatory capital can be
comprised of cocos rather than common equity shares. The management
of Sonny Bank believes that selling cocos to the debt markets will be
cheaper than raising new equity. Participants in the debt markets want to
buy Sonny Bank's cocos because they will receive more interest on cocos
than they would on an ordinary bond issued by Sonny Bank (the higher
interest rate is meant to reflect the risk to the coco-holder that the coco
will convert to equity, but the coco-holders think it is highly unlikely that
conversion will ever actually occur).
Now imagine that a banking crisis hits. The people who bought
Sonny Bank's cocos, and who thought they were just getting a bond with
a higher yield, suddenly are forced to confront the fact that their cocos
may actually convert into equity. They might try to sell off the cocos prior
to conversion, if they can find buyers for them, but a large-scale selling of
cocos is likely to make the value of those cocos plummet. Alternatively,
they might try to hedge their risk by shorting Sonny Bank's stock, or by
buying a CDS that references Sonny Bank. If this occurs on a large scale,
Sonny Bank's stock price is likely to fall and the cost of buying CDSs on
Sonny Bank will increase. The rest of the financial markets, already
unnerved that a seemingly unlikely conversion event suddenly seems
possible, will watch with interest as the market prices of Sonny Bank's
cocos and stock decline and the yield on its CDSs increases. These
indicators are likely to confirm the markets' suspicions that Sonny Bank
is in trouble, further damaging confidence in Sonny Bank.
The experience of the last Financial Crisis suggests that once
confidence in Sonny Bank has been significantly damaged by panic
selling, short selling, and the use of CDSs, counterparties that would
ordinarily provide funding to Sonny Bank will restrict the availability of
that funding. Like most banks, Sonny Bank will be unable to function for
very long without its customary short-term funding and it may fail (or, if
it is large and interconnected enough, the government may bail it out).
Even if Sonny Bank is recapitalized with new equity (following the
occurrence of a trigger event), it is quite possible that the shock of the
actual conversion will be so damaging to market confidence in Sonny
Bank that it will be unable to re-establish its normal short-term funding
sources, notwithstanding its new capital. The irony of cocos is, thus, that
they can precipitate the failure of the very financial institutions they were
intended to help.
In a broad banking crisis, this hypothetical scenario is likely to play
out in a similar way for multiple coco-issuing banks. If sufficient banks
are affected, then the supply of credit to the rest of the economy will be
restricted and economic growth may be stunted. Regulators need to
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engage in some creative thinking, attempting to envisage all the possible
permutations and combinations of the consequences of widespread use
of cocos, before endorsing the use of these instruments. This Article
contributes to that endeavor with a detailed examination of how cocos
are likely to interact with some other financial instruments and trading
strategies in a crisis situation.
This Article starts with a discussion of regulatory capital in the wake
of the Financial Crisis. This sets the backdrop for a discussion of whether
banks and other financial institutions in the United States should be
encouraged to issue cocos. These instruments are being promoted by
some academics and regulators as a less costly substitute for common
equity that will nonetheless improve the stability of financial institutions
in crisis situations." However, after surveying the importance of
confidence in financial institutions (concluding that confidence is both
vitally important to the functioning of the financial system and very
fickle), this Article explores in detail how cocos are likely to affect
confidence in our hypothetical Sonny Bank. This exercise indicates that
the issuance of cocos is likely to incentivize behaviors and trading
strategies that have the potential to harm confidence and financialinstitution stability in a crisis situation. This harm may outweigh the
benefits of any recapitalization that a coco can provide. This Article
finishes by considering a recent challenge to the assumption that
common equity is expensive and concludes that it would be better for
systemic stability to require banks to hold more common equity, rather
than cocos.
II. REGULATORY CAPITAL
Regulatory capital is the amount of equity (or other qualifying
instruments) that a bank is required by law to hold to enable it to absorb
losses.15 The basic premise of regulatory capital requirements is that a
bank with a regulatory capital cushion will be better able to internalize
any losses that it suffers, and therefore be less likely to fail or require
Regulatory capital requirements are ex ante
public support.'
requirements (i.e. banks are required to build up capital cushions long
before any sign of trouble), because a bank will find it difficult to raise
new capital if it waits until it starts to suffer significant losses on its
assets." Regulatory capital serves two purposes: where regulatory capital
" See Fournier, supra note 12, at 24; Arthur E. Wilmarth,Jr., The Dodd-FrankAct: A
Flawed and Inadequate Response to the Too-Big-to-Fail Problem, 89 OR. L. REv. 951, 1008
(2011); Note, supra note 12, at 1869-70; Hughes, supranote 12.
' Samuel G. Hanson et al., A MacroprudentialApproach to Financial Regulation,
25J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 4 (2011).
6 Id.

The reason for this difficulty is often referred to as the "debt overhang"
problem: a bank will find it difficult to raise new capital because of the likelihood that
any new capital raised will be immediately applied to existing obligations to senior
17
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acts as a cushion that enables a bank to bear losses on its assets as it
continues to operate, it is known as "going-concern capital." A bank that
has large amounts of going-concern caital is more likely to absorb losses
and less likely to fail in difficult times. Where capital is intended to be
applied to reduce losses to creditors of the bank in the event that that
bank does fail, it is known as "gone-concern capital."
are reasonably consistent
requirements
Regulatory capital
throughout the world, because they are generally based on international
standards. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) is an
international body comprising representatives from bank supervisors
from 27 different countries, including the United States.2' The BCBS has
promulgated international standards that set out complicated formulae

debtholders, and thus the providers of the new capital will immediately see their
investment wiped out. See id. at 6. There is also a concern that bank balance sheets are
often lagging indicators of problems and that without ex ante capital requirements a
bank may not realize that it needs to raise capital until it is too late. See Mark J.
Flannery, No Pain, No Gain? Effecting Market Discipline via "Reverse Convertible
Debentures, " in CAPITAL ADEQUACY BEYOND

BASEL:

BANKING, SECURITIES, AND INSURANCE

171, 172-73 (Hal S. Scott ecl., 2005).
"

See Pazarbasioglu et al., supra note 4, at 10; PITT ET AL., supra note 11, at 3-4.
See Hal S. Scott, The Reduction of Systemic Risk in the United States FinancialSystem,

33 HARV.J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 671, 679 (2010).
'o See Pazarbasioglu etal., supra note 4, at 10; PITTETAL., supra note 11, at4.
2' About the Basel Committee, BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, http://www.bis.org/

bcbs/index.htm. Standards promulgated by the BCBS apply not only to the 27
member countries, but to many other countries as well. The IMF and the World Bank
often require countries to comply with the BCBS's standards as a condition of
receiving assistance. Still more countries have chosen to comply with the BCBS's
standards as best practices or to provide comfort to foreign investors. See KERN
ALEXANDER ET AL., GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF FINANCIAL SYSTEMS: THE INTERNATIONAL
REGULATION OF SYSTEMIC RISK 39 (2006).
'2 The standards that have been issued by the BCBS are colloquially known as
Basel I, Basel II, and Basel III. Formally speaking, Basel I is a document titled
"International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards," that was
published by the BCBS in July of 1988. Basel I (like the subsequent Basel II and III
standards) was not binding on individual nations, but each of the then G-10 nations
committed to implement Basel I into national law by the end of 1992. See Basel

Comm. on Banking Supervision, International Convergence of Capital Measurement and
Capital
Standards,
BANK
FOR
INT'L
SETTLEMENTS
(July
1988),

http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs04a.pdf. As Basel I became outmoded, the BCBS
issued a document titled "International Convergence of Capital Measurements and
Capital Standards: A Revised Framework" in June of 2004. This is colloquially known
as Basel II and was intended to be phased in from 2006 through 2009. However, even
before the implementation was complete, the Financial Crisis showed the regulatory
capital requirements of Basel II to be inadequate. The BCBS responded with a
compilation of documents that have come to be known as Basel III. The key
document setting out regulatory capital requirements under Basel III was released on
December 16, 2010. Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Basel III: A Global
Regulatoty Framework for More Resilient Banks and Banking Systems, BANK FOR INT'L
SETTLEMENTS (Dec. 2010, rev. June 2011), http://www.bis.org/pibl/bcbsl89.pdf
[hereinafter Basel II]. Basel III was endorsed in principle by the leaders of all the

2012]

COCOS CAN DRIVE MARKETS CUCKOO

131

for the amount of regulatory capital that each bank must hold. The
standards make it clear that not all types of regulatory capital are created
equal: the best, most loss-absorbent type of capital is common equity,
and under the standards known as "Basel 1II," 5 all banks must satisfy a
certain amount of their capital requirements with common equity (often
referred to as "Tier 1" common equity).2 The remainder of regulatory
capital can be partly held in "Additional Tier 1" instruments (Additional
Tier 1 instruments must be going-concern capital, such as perpetual noncumulative preference shares) and partly held in "Tier 2" instruments
(Tier 2 instruments can be gone-concern capital, including some types of
subordinated debt) . Basel III also requires banks to phase out reliance
on many types of hybrid debt-equity instruments that had previously
21
counted toward regulatory capital requirements. In addition, the BCBS
has proposed additional capital requirements for global systemically
211
important banks. While the details of these requirements have not yet
been settled,"' the BCBS has indicated that these requirements will need
to be met with common equity.

G20 Nations at the G20 Summit held in Seoul on November 11-12, 2010. See The
G20 Seoul Summit Leaders' Declaration (Nov. 11-12, 2010).
23 The amount of capital that a bank is required to hold
is equal to a specified
percentage of that bank's "risk-weighted assets." Basel III, supra note 22. Determining
a bank's risk-weighted assets is a complicated calculation that reflects the perceived
riskiness of assets held by the bank and the perceived likelihood that a bank's
contingent obligations will crystallize into actual obligations. Id. Basel III effectively
requires banks to maintain a ratio of regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets of at
least 10.5% (the minimum required ratio is in fact 8%, but any bank that holds less
than 10.5% will face restrictions on its ability to pay dividends and bonuses, or engage
in share buy-backs). Id.
SId.; see also Hanson et al., supra note 15, at 9.
2
The BCBS has indicated that the phased implementation of Basel III should
commence byJanuary 1, 2013. BaselIII, supranote 22, annex 4.
26 Id.
27 Id.
2' During the Financial Crisis, hybrid debt-equity instruments did not perform as
expected: they did not absorb the losses that they had been intended to absorb. For
this reason, the BCBS has stated that "[i]nnovative hybrid capital instruments with an
incentive to redeem through features such as step-up clauses, currently limited to
15% of the Tier 1 capital base, will be phased out." Id. at 2.
2
In July 2011, the BCBS issued a consultative document regarding a proposal to
require global systemically important banks to hold even more capital-this extra
capital requirement is likely to range between 1% and 2.5% of the risk-weighted assets
of the bank, depending on its systemic importance. Basel Comm. on Banking
Supervision, Global Systemically Important Banks: Assessment Methodology and the Additional
(July 2011),
Loss Absorbency Requirement, BANK FOR INT'L SETrLEMENTs
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs201.pdf [hereinafter Global Systemically Important Banks].
As of August 2011.
a Measures of Global Systemically Important Banks Agreed by the Group of Governors and
Heads of Supervision, BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS (June 25, 2011), http://www.bis.org
/press/pl 10625.htm; Global Systemically Important Banks, supra note 29.
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Requiring a bank to hold going-concern and gone-concern capital
reduces the risk that such bank will need a government bailout, and thus
potentially lessens moral hazard with respect to that bank . From the
perspective of society at large, it is therefore beneficial to require banks
to hold sufficient capital. Most capital regulations are premised on the
notion that, absent regulation, banks have little incentive to hold large
amounts of equity as regulatory capital: there is a general consensus that
capital in the form of equity is a more expensive form of funding than
debt, and so banks would prefer to fund themselves with debt. Also, for
banks that are so big or interconnected that they expect a government
bailout in the event of failure, it makes little sense to hold increased
amounts of equity: increased amounts of equity would mean that the
bank's shareholders would bear losses in a crisis, while an absence of
equity would mean that those losses could be distributed to taxpayers in a
bailout." Regulatory capital requirements make it more likely that
existing shareholders, rather than taxpayers, will bear the consequences
of problems at a bank.""
The standards promulgated by the BCBS only apply to banks and not
to other types of financial institutions. 3" However, some economists argue

" Moral hazard is an economic concept that originated in the context of
insurance: Essentially, moral hazard is the tendency of insurance or a guarantee (or
something else that insulates a person from loss) to lessen a person's incentives to act
prudently. See Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEx. L. Rrv. 237, 270
(1996). When incentives are affected by moral hazard, the rewards for acting
imprudently are increased because the likelihood of bearing the costs of acting
imprudently is reduced. Karl S. Okamoto, After the Bailout: Regulating Systemic Moral

Hazard, 57 UCLA L. REv. 183, 185 (2009). When dealing with financial institutions,
there is a moral hazard if the financial institution, its shareholders and its
debtholders anticipate that the institution will be bailed out by the government in a
time of crisis. In such circumstances, the managers of the institution will have fewer
incentives to act prudently, and its shareholders and debtholders will have fewer
incentives to exert pressure on management to do so. See Pazarbasioglu et al., supra
note 4, at 7.
3
Interest on debt obligations is often tax deductible, which is part of the reason
why debt is usually viewed as cheaper than equity. PITT ET AL., supra note I, at 12.
Hanson, Kashyap, and Stein consider other reasons why debt might be cheaper than
equity, including risk and utility as a transactional medium. Hanson et al., supra note
15, at 17-18. However, some have challenged the notion that equity is more
expensive for society than debt. See generally Adrmati et al., supra note 9. This issue is
discussed in more detail in Part VII, infra.
m KENNETH R. FRENCH ET AL., THE SQUAM LAKE REPORT: FIXING THE FINANCIAL
SysTEM 70, 94 (2010).
Pazarbasioglu et al., supra note 4, at 14-15. It should be noted that proponents
of cocos do not consider them a "silver bullet" solution to financial sector instability.
Instead, cocos are supported as part of an arsenal of macroprudential tools intended
to improve the stability of financial institutions. Other tools include increased
supervision, stricter prudential standards for systemically important financial
institutions, liquidity requirements, and improved resolution regimes. See generally
FRENCH ET AL., supra note 34.
3
Basel III, supra note 22, at 12.
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that regulatory capital standards should be applied to financial
institutions beyond banks. This view has found favor in the United
States, where the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act (Dodd-Frank)8 directs the Board of Governors of the
Financial Reserve System (FRB) to set risk-based capital requirements for
systemically important non-bank financial institutions.3
III. THE RISE OF COCOS
A.

Regulatory Capitaland Convertibility

In the aftermath of the Financial Crisis, there has been much
discussion of whether automatically convertible debt should qualify as
regulatory capital. 0 Convertible debt is presumed to be cheaper for
banks to issue than equity, but it can automatically convert into equity,
enabling banks to raise equity in times of crisis when raising new capital
would otherwise be impossible. 4 ' The benefits of such automatic
conversion were summarized as follows in The Squam Lake Report, a
prominent report on financial regulatory reform promulgated by a group
of leading economists in 2010:
Conversion would automatically recapitalize banks quickly with
minimal disruptions to operations. Freed of an excessive debt
burden, banks would be able to raise more private capital to fund
operations. They would not need capital infusions from the
government, and the government would not have to acquire the
assets of troubled banks. Finally, the prospect of a conversion of

For instance, Hanson, Kashyap, and Stein note that "there is a strong
presumption" that macroprudential regulation, including regulatory capital
requirements, should apply to financial institutions beyond insured deposit-taking
banks. Hanson et al., supra note 15, at 7.
" Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
" See id. at § 165(b). The FRB must set such requirements unless, in consultation
with the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), it concludes that "such
requirements are not appropriate for a company subject to more stringent prudential
standards because of the activities of such company (such as investment company
activities or assets under management) or structure, in which case, the Board of
Governors shall apply other standards that result in similarly stringent risk controls." Id.
"o Although increased attention has been paid to convertible capital in the wake
of the Financial Crisis, the concept of automatic conversion is not new. For example,
Mark J. Flannery authored a chapter in a book published in 2005 that discussed a
type of "reverse convertible debentures" that were similar in detail to cocos. In his
book chapter, Flannery also surveyed even earlier proposals for convertible debt
instruments. Flannery, supra note 17, at 190-91.
" Pazarbasioglu et al., supra note 4, at 7. Automatic convertibility distinguishes
cocos from ordinary convertible bonds, which convert into equity at the option of the
bondholder.
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long-term debt to equity is likely to make short-term creditors and
other counterparties more confident about a bank's future.
The prospect of conversion is also intended to reduce moral
hazard." By shifting the costs of financial institution failure from
taxpayers generally to an institution's convertible debt holders, those
debt holders are thought to be incentivized to keep a closer eye on the
institution's management and ensure that it is acting prudently."
Existing equity holders, who do not want to see their shares diluted in a
conversion scenario, are also incentivized to monitor management and to
vote with their feet by selling their shares if they consider that
management is acting imprudently.
The BCBS is a proponent of convertibility with respect to Additional
Tier I "going-concern" instruments and Tier 2 "gone-concern"
instruments, and has indicated that they should all be convertible into
equity (or written down) upon the earlier of:
(1) a decision that a write-off, without which the firm would
become non-viable, is necessary, as determined by the [issuing
bank's regulator]; and (2) the decision to make a public sector
injection of capital, or equivalent support, without which the firm
would have become non-viable, as determined by the [issuing
bank's regulator]."
This requirement for convertibility in regulatory capital instruments has
helped spark interest in cocos. 7 The BCBS has recently noted that it "will
continue to review contingent capital, and support the use of contingent
capital to meet higher national loss absorbency requirements than the
global minimum, as high-trigger contingent capital could help absorb
losses on a going concern basis."
B. Uncertainty About Cocos
The BCBS's support for
though. It disappointed many
common equity (rather than
additional capital requirements

contingent capital is not unqualified,
market participants when it stated that
cocos) should be used to satisfy the
for global systemically important banks."

4

FRENCH ET AL., supra note

'

See PITrET AL., supra note 11, at 5.

34, at 90.

Pazarbasioglu et al., supra note 4, at 7.
Final Elements of the Reforms to Raise the Quality of Regulatory Capital Issued by the
Basel Committee, BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS (Jan. 13, 2011), http://www.bis.org
/press/pl 10113.htm [hereinafter FinalElements of the Reforms].
4 Id.
4
Id.
" Measures for Global Systemically Important Banks Agreed by the Group of Governors
and Heads of Supervision, supra note 31.

' For example, Daniel Bell of Bank of America Merrill Lynch made the
following comment on the BCBS's position: "Given [that] investor demand for the
product is on the up, it is Unfortunate that contingent capital will play a smaller role
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The BCBS's reservations stem largely from uncertainty about the nature
and form of contingent capital. 5o Even the terminology is unsettled: the
terms "coco" and "contingent capital" are sometimes used
interchangeably, but the general consensus is that contingent capital, as a
category of instruments, is broader than just cocos." Contingent capital
instruments are any instruments that can be used to recapitalize a
financial institution upon the occurrence of a trigger event." This
category includes cocos, as well as instruments that can be written down
(rather than converting into equity) upon the occurrence of a trigger
event.
More importantly, there is not yet any concrete consensus as to what
should constitute a "trigger event." The BCBS has taken the view that the
3
trigger should be determined by the discretion of the issuer's regulator.
However, within this school of thought, there are questions as to whether
the regulator should call a trigger only if there is a system-wide crisis, or
at any time when there are questions about an individual institution's
viability. Conversely, in its report on contingent capital, Goldman Sachs
took the view that cocos that count toward "going-concern" capital
requirements need to have more objective triggers. 5 A more objective
trigger could be market-based (for example, if the stock price of the
issuer drops below a certain specified amount, or the CDS spread on the
issuer increases beyond a certain specified amount). " Alternatively, the
trigger could be capital-based (for example if the ratio of the issuer's
capital to risk-weighted assets falls below a statutory or contractually set
minimum) . Some have advocated a dual trigger, requiring a failure to
maintain a specified capital ratio as well as a declaration of systemic crisis
by the issuer's regulator. There is one common theme in all of these
disparate types of proposed trigger events: in each case, conversion

than expected." Matthew Attwood, Basel Pops CoCo Market Hope, REUTERS (June 27,
2011, 12:39 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011 /06/27/us-coco-credit-ifridUSTRE75Q2BX20110627.
5
Global Systemically Important Banks, supra note 29, at 26 ("An analysis of the pros
and cons of contingent capital is made difficult by the fact that it is a largely untested
instrument that could come in many different forms.").
51 See PITT ET AL., supra note 11, at 3.
52 Id.
5
5

FinalElements of the Reforms, supra note 45.
See Charles A.E. Goodhart, Are CoCos from Cloud Cuckoo-Land?, Vox (June 10,

2010), http://voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/5159.
5 See PITT ET AL., supra note 11, at 3-4.
5
See id. at 7.
5' For firther discussion and detail on the possible triggers for cocos see id. at 6
and Pazarbasioglu et al., supranote 4, at 9.
58 FRENCH ET AL., supra note 34, at 91.

136

LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW

[Vol.16:1

should only be triggered upon the occurrence of a low-probability, highimpact event (sometimes referred to as a "fat tail" event).
Another unsettled aspect is the optimum conversion mechanism for
cocos: debt will convert to equity upon the occurrence of a trigger event,
but at what rate? The simplest option is to have the coco convert to a
fixed number of equity shares upon the occurrence of the trigger event.
Alternatively, the cocos could convert to a fixed value of equity shares,
which would require a conversion formula to be included in the coco
instrument at the time of issuance.'" There are infinite ways of structuring
conversion formulae,"' but the IMF has identified four subsets of such
formulae: (i) conversion at the par value of the stock at the time of
conversion; (ii) conversion below the par value of the stock at the time of
conversion; (iii) conversion related to the trading price of the coco at the
time of conversion; and (iv) conversion at a rate that reflects both the
value of the stock at the time of conversion and the capital needs of the
coco issuer." Where the coco includes any type of conversion formula,
the true conversion rate would not be known until a trigger event actually
occurs.
Determining the optimum combination of coco trigger and
conversion mechanism is beyond the scope of this Article: such a
determination would require careful consideration of whether the coco
is intended to be used as going-concern or gone-concern capital, what
structure can be marketed to investors, and the impact of conversion on
the broader financial system. What this Article can do, however, is look at
the different types of trigger events and conversion formulae that have
been proposed for going-concern cocos, and examine their potential to
affect, and be affected by, confidence in the financial institutions that
have issued the cocos. This is discussed in detail in Part VI.
C. NationalImplementation of Contingent CapitalStandards
Although most nations base their regulatory capital standards on the
recommendations of the BCBS, these recommendations are not
implemented uniformly throughout the world.' At this stage, it is not
clear whether U.S. regulators see utility in contingent capital
requirements, and if they do, what form they would prefer such
contingent capital to take. Several provisions of Dodd-Frank suggest that
there is political will to pursue contingent capital reform in the United
States: Dodd-Frank directs the Financial Stability Oversight Council
5
For a discussion of "fat tail" events, see Peter Conti-Brown, A Proposed Fat-Tail
Risk Metric: Disclosures,Derivatives, and the Measurement of FinancialRisk, 87 WASH. U. L.
REv. 1461, 1462-65 (2010).
'"' These two options are discussed in more detail in FRENCH ET AL., supra note 34,
at 92-93.
See Pazarbasioglu et al., supra note 4, at 11.
Id. at app. II, app. tbl.2.
"
See ALEXANDER ET AL., Supra note 21, at 37-38.
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(FSOC)6 4 to "conduct a study of the feasibility, benefits, costs, and
structure of a contin ent capital requirement" for systemically important
financial institutions. Upon completing the study, the FSOC can direct
the FRB to make rules requiring systemically important financial
institutions "to maintain a minimum amount of contingent capital that is
,66
convertible to equity in times of financial stress." Although not
conclusive on the subject, this wording of the statute suggests a
preference by Congress for contingent capital to take the form of cocos
that convert to equity (rather than contingent capital that can be written
down), as well as a preference for a regulatory, rather than market-based,
trigger.
Support for cocos among U.S. regulators is not assured, though.
Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner, who is the current Chairperson of
the FSOC, has publicly stated that he does not think that contingent
capital instruments are needed in the United States.67 Geithner maintains
that there are other macroprudential protections available in the United
States, most notably resolution authority for financial institutions, that
make contingent capital unnecessary. However, very few people accept
that the resolution authority for systemically important financial firms
that was introduced in Dodd-Frank will be effective in practice, especially
for large financial firms that have significant trans-border operations.
Geithner's reason for withholding support for contingent capital is
therefore flawed, and it may not be persuasive for other members of the

'
This is a new inter-agency regulatory body formed pursuant to Title I of DoddFrank. The members of the FSOC include, inter alia, the Secretary of the Treasury
(who acts as Chairperson of the FSOC) and the heads of the FRB, the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC), the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub.
L. No. 111-203, § 111, 124 Stat. 1376, 1392-94 (2010).
Id. 115(c)(1).
The FSOC's authority to give this direction is in § 115 of Dodd-Frank. The
FRB's authority to make such regulations derives from section 165 of Dodd-Frank. Id.
§§ 115 (c) (3) (A), 165.
67 See Remarks by Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner to the International Monetary
Conference, at 3 (June 6, 2011).

68 Id.

" In a blog post, prominent economist Simon Johnson states, "I've talked
repeatedly with senior officials in the United States and other countries about the
resolution authority, and I've also discussed the issue directly with some of the top
legal minds on Wall Street, people who work closely with big banks. Mr. Geithner's
interpretation is simply wrong.. . . There is no cross-border resolution mechanism or
other framework that will handle the failure of a bank like Citigroup, JPMorgan
Chase or Goldman Sachs in an orderly manner. The only techniques available are
those used by Mr. Geithner and his colleagues in September 2008-a mad scramble
to find buyers for assets, backed by Federal Reserve and other government guarantees
for creditors." SinmonJohnson, The Banking Emperor Has No Clothes, N.Y. TIMES (June 9,
2011), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/06/09/the-banking-emperor-has-noclothes.
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FSOC. Furthermore, many large financial institutions may lobby to use
cocos to satisfy regulatory capital requirements in place of the common
equity that they consider more expensive. These lobbying efforts may
prove convincing for regulators.
If the United States does proceed with contingent capital
requirements, it is likely to look to Switzerland's example. Switzerland
currently leads the world in the national implementation of a contingent
capital regime. The Swiss government has proposed legislation, which is
expected to be enacted in 2012, requiring Credit Suisse and UBS (the
two largest Swiss banks) to hold regulatory capital in an amount equal to
at least 19% of their risk-weighted assets, even more regulatory capital
than Basel III requires." The Swiss regulator (the Financial Market
Supervisory Authority, or FINMA) justifies the higher capital
requirements on the basis that each of Credit Suisse and UBS is
"indispensable to the economy owing to its size, market position and
interconnectedness with a large number of other market participants, as
well as the impossibility of substituting the services it provides within a
reasonable period of time."7 FINMA has encouraged the use of cocos by
agreeing that Credit Suisse and UBS can satisfy their regulatory capital
obligations with contingent capital instruments in an amount equal to
approximately 9% of their risk-weighted assets. The Swiss have also
encouraged the issuance of cocos by clarifying that interest payments on
cocos are tax deductible (essentially, that cocos will receive debt tax
treatment).7
FINMA defines cocos as "capital instruments that are automatically
converted into equity when a bank's eguity ratio drops below a
predefined level (trigger) or are written off, " and Switzerland's Council

Rozansky, supra note 11.
Swiss FIN. MKi. SUPERVISORYAUTH. FINMA, supra note 11, at 11.
2 Starting in 2012, the Swiss will require
that Credit Suisse and UBS hold
common equity in an amount equal to at least 10% of their risk-weighted assets. Up
to 35% of the required common equity (referred to by FINMA as the buffer
requirement) can be comprised of contingent capital instruments. In addition to the
buffer requirement, Credit Suisse and UBS are required to hold other capital in an
7

7

amount approximately equal to 6% of their risk-weighted assets (referred to by
FINMA as the progressive requirement). This means that, in total, Credit Suisse and

UBS can hold approximately 9% of their risk-weighted assets in contingent capital
instruments, and so satisfy the Swiss regulatory capital requirements. Of this 9%,
approximately one-third (i.e., the contingent capital which is counted toward the
banks' common equity or "buffer" requirements) must convert to common equity if

the banks' common equity to risk-weighted assets ratios drop below 7%. The
remaining two-thirds (i.e., the contingent capital that is used to satisfy the
requirement that the banks hold 6% of their risk-weighted assets in other capital (the
"progressive" requirement)) must convert if the ratio drops below 5%. Id. at 12.
' Elena Logutenkova & Klaus Wille, UBS, Credit Suisse May Need to Boost Capital to
19%, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 4, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-10-04/ubscredit-suisse-must-boost-capital-to-m eet-swiss-regulator-requirements.html.
7 Swiss FIN. MKT. SUPERVISORYAUTH. FINMA, supra note 11, at 12.
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of Experts defines them as "[d]ebt capital which may be converted into
corporate capital or written off once a contractually defined threshold
(trigger) is reached or state assistance is provided" (the Council of
Experts also notes that they have only considered cocos with a regulatory
capital ratio trigger) . It appears from these statements that the Swiss
favor certainty with regard to a predefined trigger, perhaps indicating
less support for the ability of a regulator to subjectively determine the
occurrence of a trigger event. Also, the Swiss consider all contingent
capital instruments to be cocos, including instruments that could be
written down upon the occurrence of a trigger event (these latter
instruments would not be classified as "cocos" under the definition
established in the introduction to this Article). 6
D.

Market Sentiment Toward Cocos

To date,7 there have been very few issuances of coco-like
instruments. There have been no issuances in the United States,
although Credit Suisse has filed a registration statement with the SEC for
a coco issuance.'8 Outside of the United States, Lloyds issued "enhanced
capital notes" in 2009, which included a provision that the notes would
convert into a fixed number of common equity shares if the ratio of
Lloyd's core Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets were to fall below 5%.
These instruments fit our definition of "coco," but they were only issued
to existing debtholders as part of a debt exchange.8 0 As the notes were
not offered to new investors, the issuance was not a real test of whether

there is a market for contingent capital.
More recently, an issuance by Credit Suisse in February 2011 was
partly a debt exchange but also included a new public issuance of two
billion francs worth of cocos." This public issuance was very successful,
which suggests that investors may indeed want to buy contingent capital.
The instruments offered by Credit Suisse have a dual trigger: the
instruments will convert to equity on the earlier of (i) a determination by
Credit Suisse's regulator that Credit Suisse "requires public sector
'
FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF EXPERTS FOR LIMITING THE EcoNoMic RISKS
POSED BY LARGE COMPANIES 25 (2010) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSION
OF EXPERTS].

See generally id.

" Current as of August 2011.
78 Danielle Robinson, IFR-CreditSuisse Gears up for US CoCos, REUTERS (June 4,2011),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/03/markets-credit-idUSN315800020110603.
7 The conversion rate was fixed, based on the share price at the time the notes
were issued. See Ass'N FOR FIN. MKTS. IN EUROPE (AFME), PREVENTION AND CURE:
SECURING FINANcIAL STABILIYAFTER THE CRISIs, at annex 2a (2010).
80 PiTrETAL., supra note 11, at app. B; Humphreys & Pinedo, supra note 10, at 70.
8' Matthew Attwood & Jane Merriman, Credit Suisse Steps Up CoCo Pace with
2
$2 Billion Bond, REUTERS (Feb. 17, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/ 011

/02/17/us-creditsuisse-cocos-idUSTRE71G5W220110217.
82

See id.

LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW

140

[Vol. 16:1

support to prevent it from becoming insolvent, bankrupt or unable to
pay a material amount of its debts, or other similar circumstances," and
(ii) the fall of Credit Suisse's ratio of common equity to risk-weighted
assets below 7%. The formula for conversion was established at the time
84
of issuance.
There are many issues that the markets will need to resolve if cocos
are to become a sizeable asset class. It is very difficult to accurately price
the risk of conversion."' Especially if cocos have subjective trigger events
that are determined by the discretion of national regulators, the
uncertainty surrounding conversion may be such that such instruments
will have to be priced so high as to be prohibitively expensive for issuers.
Uncertainties about the risk of conversion and how cocos will operate
also make it hard for credit rating agencies to rate cocos; institutional
investors in particular rely heavily on credit ratings, and they may have
little interest in cocos if they are unrated.81 With so few issuances to date,
it is difficult to tell if there will be a real market for these instruments, but
if a robust market for cocos does indeed grow, regulators need to be
concerned about the impact that large numbers of cocos can have on the
financial markets.
IV. CONFIDENCE IS ALL-IMPORTANT
Regulatory capital requirements have found favor because they are
relatively simple and powerful regulatory tools." However, as discussed
below, a financial institution that starts with sufficient capital may
nonetheless be brought down by a loss of confidence, and that loss of
confidence may be rational or irrational. Financial regulators must
therefore be wary of incentivizing behavior that unnecessarily jeopardizes

PITT ETAL., supra note 11, at app. B.
"Id.

An instrument that can be both debt and equity also raises a host of accounting
and taxation issues that are beyond the scope of this Article, except to note that if cocos
are not treated as debt instruments for taxation purposes, they may be viewed by issuing
banks as equally expensive as equity. With regard to the importance of cocos being seen
as cheaper than equity, see Hanson et al., supra note 15, at 12.
Humphreys & Pinedo, supra note 10, at 71.
1 Ass'N FOR FIN. MKTS. IN EUROPE, supra note 79, at 48-49; PITT ET AL., supranote
11, at 13.
88 Ass'N FOR FIN. MKTS. IN EUROPE, supra note 79, at 49. Ed Devlin, a fund

manager at PIMCO, was quoted by Reuters as saying "Ratings are beneficial not
because we rely on them, hut often in guidelines our clients give us ... We have to
have ratings. It's the same for most institutional and retail money managers."
Merriman, snpra note 11. See alsoJane Merriman, Analysis-Ratings Uncertainty Stunts
Contingent Capital Growth, REUTERS (Aug. 6, 2010, 12:26 PM), http://uk.reuters.com

/article/2010/08/06/uk-contingent-iclUKTRE67522220100806.
" "Regulators should use many tools to make firms internalize systemic dangers
and reduce the chance of a crisis, but capital requirements are among the most
powerful." FRENCH ET AL., supra note 34, at 137.
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confidence in financial institutions. Unfortunately, confidence is a
complicated, irrational, and amorphous thing, and it is often difficult to
tell how regulatory actions will affect it.
A.

Why Confidence Is So Vital

There is considerable literature on the importance of confidence in
the functioning of financial markets. 0 This literature often seems to
consider the concepts of confidence and trust together,09 but these
concepts merit separate treatment. Confidence has several facets, and
affirmative answers to both of the following statements are prerequisites
for investor confidence:
(i) If it is within a counterparty's power to do so, will that
counterparty honor its promises?
(ii) Even if a counterparty wishes to honor its promises, will it be
able to?
92
The first concept equates more to traditional notions of trust. This
Article does not consider this aspect of confidence in detail-instead, it
presumes that financial institutions and other actors are trustworthy in
the sense that they would honor their obligations if they could,9 3 and
concentrates on the second type of confidence as it applies to bankspublic sentiment about the ability of those banks to honor their
obligations.
It has long been recognized that banks cannot serve their socially
utile functions without this second type of confidence. As E. Gerald
Corrigan states in his summary of his classic 1982 essay "Are Banks
Special?":
[B]anks perform three essential functions: (1) they issue
transaction accounts (i.e., they hold liabilities that are payable on
demand at par and that are readily transferable to third parties);
(2) they are the backup source of liquidity to all other institutions,
financial and nonfinancial; and (3) they are the transmission belt
for monetary policy.

o See generally Raymond H. Brescia, Trust in the Shadows: Law, Behavior and

Financial Re-Regulation, 57 BuFF. L. REv. 1361 (2009); Ronald J. Colombo, The Role of
Trust in FinancialRegulation, 55 VILL. L. REv. 577 (2010).
See, e.g., Brescia, supranote 90, at 1362.
"

a This type of trust/confidence is very important to the proper functioning of
the financial system: "Trust acts as a lubricant and reduces the transaction costs
associated with economic conduct; its presence makes economic activity more
efficient and permits actors to focus on wealth generation rather than wealth
preservation." Id. at 1363.
13 This is a big presumption of course, and one that is not likely to be always
borne out in reality. However, for analytical purposes, it is easier to examine the issue
of the market's perception of financial institutions in isolation from issues of
misrepresentation and fraud.
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On close inspection, it becomes evident that these essential
functions are highly interdependent and that banks' ability to
perform such functions dictates the need for a high degree of
public confidence in the overall financial condition of banks . . . .
Confidence is especially important (and vulnerable) when there is
insufficient information available to counterparties to enable them to
make an informed decision about whether to deal with an institution.
This is often the case when dealing with complex financial institutions,
whose operations tend to be opaque and whose risk profiles can change
very quickly."' Even with perfect information, it would be almost
impossible to properly evaluate all the permutations and combinations of
risk associated with a complex financial institution, " and it follows that a
certain degree of confidence must fill this diligence gap."
Confidence in financial institutions is a complex sentiment. The

economists George A. Akerlof and RobertJ. Shiller describe confidence
(and the lack thereof) as a product of collective narratives about a person
or an event:
Confidence is not just the emotional state of an individual. It is a
view of other people's confidence, and of other people's
perceptions of other people's confidence. It is also a view of the
world-a popular model of current events, a public understanding
of the mechanism of economic change as informed by the news
media and by popular discussions."
They go on to describe loss of confidence (as well as the build-up of
overconfidence) as contagious, drawing parallels from the spread of
disease epidemics.' Viewed in this way, a loss of confidence in a financial

"' E. Gerald Corrigan, Sumnaty of Are Banks Special?, Fed. RES. BANK OF
MINNEAPOLIS (Jan. 1, 1983), http://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications-papers
/publdisplay.cfm?id=684. In a more facetiotis vein, Raymond Moley (a former advisor

to Franklin Roosevelt) noted, "We knew how much of banking depended upon makebelieve or, stated more conservatively, the vital part that public confidence had in
assuring solvency." RAYMOND MOLEY, THE FIRST NEw DEAL 171 (1966).
" Certain batik assets (such as loans to small businesses) are "particularly opaque
and difficult to assess from the outside." Admati et al., supra note 9, at 28. The
Goldman Sachs Global Markets Institute comments on the "poor quality of available
accounting data for banks." PITT ET AL., supra note 11, at 8.
"' In fact, during the Financial Crisis, many financial institutions did not even
have a clear and complete picture of their own operations and risk profiles. The
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission concluded in its report that "the exposures of
financial institutions to risky mortgage assets and other potential losses were
unknown to market participants, and indeed many firns did not know their own exposures."
FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT 386 (2011)
(emphasis added).
17 See GEORGE A. AKERLOF & ROBERT J. SHILLER, ANIMAL SPIRITS: How HUMAN
PSYCHOLOGY DRIVES THE ECONOMY, AND WHY IT MATTERS FOR GLOBAL CAPITALISM 14-15,

51,81, (2009).
8

"

Id. at 55.
Id. at 56.
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institution is very much about a negative change in the narrative and
public perception about the financial institution. Changes in public
perception can be attributable to rumors and conjecture, which may or
may not reflect any real change in the fundamentals of that financial
institution. Such rumors and conjecture could be an attempt to
manipulate the market, sensationalism, or merely gossip. In the context
of a negatively trending narrative, panic selling or shorting of the stock of
a financial institution, or increased demand for CDSs, can lead to
decreases in stock prices and increases in CDS spreads,o which seem to
validate the narrative that the financial institution is in trouble. A failure
of confidence can manifest itself in a "run" on a financial institution.'on
The remainder of this Part explores the theory behind, and
consequences of, runs on financial institutions.
B.

Runs on Deposits

In a prototyical deposit-taking bank, loans make up the bulk of the
bank's assets."o These loans are generally long-term, and of fixed
duration.0 3 In contrast, many of the bank's liabilities take the form of
customer deposits, which the customer can withdraw at will.' There is
therefore a "maturity mismatch" between the bank's long-term
investments and its short-term funding sources. Banks only keep a
fraction of the cash deposited with them on hand at any one time, and
are unable to liquidate their assets quickly (i.e., call in fixed-term
loans) ."o This means that a bank would become insolvent if all depositors
were to seek to get their deposits back at once. Such a circumstance is
referred to as a "run on the bank."'00
Bank runs are generally explained with reference to prisoner's
dilemma theory. '0 In a time of panic, if all the depositors in a healthy
bank refrain from making any unusual withdrawals, the bank will be able
to continue to service ordinary course withdrawals as it has done in the
"o See id. at 54-56; Gaiyan Zhang, InformationalEfficiency of Credit Default Swap and
Stock Markets: The Impact of Adverse Credit Events, 1 INT'L REV. AccT. BANKING & FIN. 1,
1-2 (2009).
' Albert J. Boro, Jr., Comment, Banking Disclosure Regimes for Regulating
Speculative Behavior, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 431, 434-35 (1986).
102 Okamoto, supra
note 32, at 192-93.
10'
Hilary J. Allen, Money Market Fund Reform Viewed Through a Systemic Risk Lens,
11 J. Bus. & SEC. L. 87, 88 (2010).
1'
Okamoto, supra note 32, at 192.
'o'

Allen, supra note 103, at 88; Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193,

199 (2008).
.o.Okamoto, supra note 32, at 193.

"In a prisoner's dilemma, individuals rationally refuse to cooperate, even though
cooperation would maximize everyone's benefit, because they cannot trust others to
cooperate and they will suffer the worst result if they cooperate and others do not."
Patricia A. McCoy, The Moral HazardImplications of DepositInsurance: Theory and Evidence, in
5 CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN FINANcIAL AND MONETARY LAw 417,435 n.15 (2008).
0'
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past, and no depositor will be harmed. However, if some depositors lose
confidence as a result of the panic and seek to withdraw all of their funds
from the bank, then the bank will need to service those withdrawals with
the cash it keeps on hand, and may run out of cash to service the
ordinary withdrawals for the depositors who have not pulled all their
money out of the bank. No depositor can be certain that other depositors
will not panic and withdraw all of their funds, and a depositor who tries
to withdraw after other depositors have taken all of the bank's cash will
be in the worst possible position. Thus the first depositor is incentivized
to withdraw his or her funds as early as possible. In a broad financial
crisis, the first depositor's incentives to withdraw are even stronger,
because a run on the bank will be exacerbated by declines in the market
values of the bank's assets, and limitations on the ability of the bank to
source liquidity elsewhere.
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the U.S.
banking system was subjected to frequent bank runs."' The populace
became fed up with this cycle of banking crises, and in the wake of the
Great Depression, popular pressure led to the introduction of legislation
that insured deposits with commercial banks up to a fixed dollar
amount."" The introduction of deposit insurance has given depositors
confidence that they will always be able to withdraw their deposits (up to
the specified cap) from commercial banks, and deposit insurance has
largely been effective in preventing runs by depositors on commercial
banks."' However, as financial activities have become more complex,
commercial banks have come to rely on many sources of short-term
funding, not just deposits, and those other sources of funding are still
vulnerable to runs."'2 Furthermore, financial institutions (such as
investment banks) that do not have access to deposit funding have

See Okamoto, supra note 32, at 193.
There were significant bank panics in the United States in 1837, 1857, 1873,
1907, and, of course, during the Great Depression. Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick,
Regulating the Shadow Banking System, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON EcoN. ACTIviTY, Fall 2010,
"

at 281-83 [hereinafter Gorton & Metrick, Regulating the Shadow Banking System].

no For a more detailed discussion of the introduction of deposit insurance, see id. at
281-83. See generally FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., A BRIEF HISTORY OF DEPOSrr INSURANCE IN THE
UNITED STATES (1998). Deposit insurance is provided by the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, which was created by the Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, § 12B(a),
48 Stat. 162, 168 (1933). There is a cap on the amount of insured deposits per account
holder per institution: when deposit insurance became effective on January 1, 1934, the
cap was $2,500, and this has increased over time. Banking Act of 1933 §12B(y). The most
recent increase was effected during the Financial Crisis in 2008, when the cap was
increased from $100,000 to $250,000. Press Release, Fed. Dep. Ins. Corp., FDIC Insurance
Coverage Permanently Increased to $250,000 per Depositer (July 21, 2010), available at
http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/ress/2010/prl161.html.
.. Hanson et al., supra note 15, at 4. See generally Douglas W. Diamond & Philip
H. Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity, 91 J. POL. EcoN. 401 (1983).
11
See generally Julie L. Stackhouse & Mark D. Vaughan, Navigating the Brave New
World of Bank Liquidity, REGIONAL ECONOMIST,July 2003, at 12.
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increasin ly become susceptible to runs on their short-term funding
sources.
C. Runs on Other Sources ofFunding

One popular source of non-deposit-based short-term funding is the
"repurchase" market: investment banks were Varticularly reliant on this
source of funding prior to the Financial Crisis. " Even after the Financial
Crisis, there continues to be heavy reliance by financial institutions on
repurchase agreements."
Repurchase agreements (known colloquially as "repos") are
agreements to sell securities with a promise to buy back those securities at
the end of a fixed period."' Practically speaking, repo transactions
operate as secured loans by repo counterparties (i.e., the buyers of
securities)" to the institutions that sell, and then repurchase, the
securities." Repo transactions are usually of short duration, often rolling
over every day, " and financial institutions often rely on this short-term
' FRENCH ET AL., supra note 34, at 54; see also ALEXANDER ET AL., supra note 21, at
55-56 (discussing securities firms and systemic risk).
' There is little conclusive data available about the size of the total repurchase
market (which comprises both bilateral and tri-party repurchase agreements), but the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York collects data on the tri-party repurchase market.
The Federal Reserve Bank of New York estimates that at its peak in 2008, over $2.8
trillion of financing was provided through the tri-party repurchase market. ADAM
COPELAND ET AL., FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y., STAFF REPORT No. 477, THE TRI-PARTY REPO
MARKET BEFORE THE 2010 REFORMS 17 (Nov. 2010). In its report, the Task Force on
Tri-Party Repo Infrastructure notes that "[a]t several points during the financial crisis
of 2007-2009, the tri-party repo market took on particular importance in relation to
the failures and near-failures of Countrywide Securities, Bear Stearns, and Lehman
Brothers." PAYMENTS RISK COMM., TASK FORCE ON TRI-PARTY REPO INFRASTRUCTURE
REPORT 4 (2010). That said, it is very difficult to get a sense of exactly how reliant
individual institutions were on repo in the lead-up to the Financial Crisis. Gary B.
Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Securitized Banking and the Run on Repo 12-13 (Yale ICF
Working Paper No. 09-14, Nov. 9, 2010) [hereinafter Gorton & Metrick, Securitized
Banking and the Run on Repo]. Gorton and Metrick note that commercial banks like
Citigroup, J.P. Morgan, and Bank of America supplement their traditional banking
activities with some investment banking activities that are reliant on funding from the
repo market, but that commercial banks are not as heavily reliant on repo as brokerdealers. Id. at 1, 13.
"' During the period between July 2009 and January 2010, the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York estimated the average size of the tri-party repurchase market as
more than $1.5 trillion. COPELAND ET AL., supra note 114, at 17. Financial institutions
are also reliant on other short-term funding sources that are susceptible to runs, such
as commercial paper. For a discussion of runs on the commercial paper market
during the Financial Crisis, see generally Allen, supra note 103.
"' For a more detailed discussion of the repurchase market, see Gorton &
Metrick, Securlized Banking and the Run on Repo, supra note 114, at 10-14.
"' FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, supra note 96, at 31. Repo counterparties
are often other banks, or money market mutual funds.
11

Id.

11 Id.
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repo finding to finance longer-term investments and trades that cannot
be easily unwound. If a repo counterparty that ordinarily engages in repo
transactions with a financial institution refuses to purchase securities
from that institution, then that is similar to a depositor withdrawing his
or her funds from a bank.'2" In each case, the party providing the funding
(either the repo counterparty or the depositor) is not obliged to
continue to provide funding, but the financial institution has an
expectation that it can rely on such funding and accordingly makes
longer-term commitments that are dependent on the continued
availability of the short-term funding. 2 1
A key difference between runs by depositors and runs by repo
counterparties is in the way funding is withdrawn. A depositor that loses
confidence in a bank simply seeks to withdraw his or her cash from the
bank. In contrast, repo counterparties often stop short of an outright
refusal to engage in repo transactions (although in extreme
circumstances, they may do just that), and instead ask for more and/or
better collateral than they would ordinarily request for the repo
Returning to prisoner's dilemma theory, the repo
transaction.
counterparty may seek more/better collateral from the financial
institution if the market starts to lose confidence in that institution, even
if the repo counterparty privately has confidence that the institution is
able to satisfy its obligations under the repo transaction. This is because if
other counterparties seek to protect themselves with more/better
collateral and the first counterparty does not, then the first counterparty
will be in the worst possible position if the financial institution deploys all
of its best assets collateralizing deals with other counterparties and gives
low-quality collateral to the first counterparty, or worse, finds itself short
of funds to repurchase the securities that form the basis of the repo trade
with the first counterparty. Because of such a funding run, the financial
institution may suffer a liquidity crisis that causes it distress,
notwithstanding that it remains solvent from an accounting
perspective. 123
The potential harmful effect of prisoner's dilemma calculus is even
greater in a system-wide financial crisis. As discussed in Part IV.B above,
in such a crisis asset values will be declining generally, which will make it
harder for the financial institution to post sufficient collateral. Other
funding sources will also be harder for the financial institution to access.
If sufficient numbers of repo counterparties act in their rational selfinterest and restrict funding to financial institutions, that collective
activity may threaten a broad range of financial institutions, which may
lead to taxpayer-fuelled bailouts. In addition, a financial institution that
fails can no longer provide credit and liquidity to the broader

so

Gorton & Metrick, Securitized Banking and the Run on Repo, supranote 114, at 1.

'

See id.
See Gorton & Metrick, Regulatingthe Shadow Banking System, supra note 109, at 279.
Admati et al., supra note 9, at 52.

12
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economy : if multiple institutions (orjust one very large institution) fail,
the resulting credit crunch may have serious implications for economic
growth. Even those institutions that have not failed may be loath to
provide credit to anyone when they are uncertain of their exposure to
failing institutions. Any resulting credit crunches will adversely affect
society as a whole, not just the stakeholders in the failing financial
institutions.
D.

The Run on BearStearns

The dramatic fall of Bear Stearns in 2008 provides an excellent
example of a short-term funding run on a financial institution. Like
many of the investment banks operating in the United States in 2008,
Bear Stearns was highly leveraged and highly reliant on short-term
funding for its investments: in the lead-up to the Financial Crisis, Bear
Stearns relied particularly on the overnight repo market for its funding. 2 6
On March 6, 2008, rumors began circulating that European banks were
refusing to trade with Bear Stearns.1 2' By March 10, 2008, rumors
suggested that some of Bear Stearns' U.S. counterparties had refused to
trade with it. 2" The media began to report that counterparties were
refusing to deal with Bear Stearns.'29 These rumors, reinforced by media
reportin., created a popular narrative of a financial institution in
The cost of purchasing CDS protection with respect to
trouble.'

" During the Financial Crisis, the problems on Wall Street began to affect other
sectors of the economy when businesses and local governments were no longer able
to obtain credit. Markus K. Brunnermeier, Decipheringthe Liquidity and Credit Crunch
2007-2008, 23J. ECON. PERSP. 77, 90 (2009).
"5 In a general environment of uncertainty, financial institutions are also likely
to reduce lending in a type of "[p]recautionary hoarding" which occurs when
"lenders are afraid that they might suffer from interim shocks and that they will need
funds for their own projects and trading strategies." Id. at 95. As mentioned above,
banks often act as repo counterparties to other banks, so precautionary hoarding can
exacerbate a run on a bank's short-term repo funding.
2' The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC) found that "Bear funded
much of its operations borrowing short-term in the repo market; it borrowed between
$50 and $70 billion overnight." FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, supra note 96, at
281. The FCIC also found that this number increased in late 2007/early 2008: Bear
Stearns increased its reliance on repo funding because it was experiencing difficulty
raising alternative funding in the commercial paper market. Id. at 283.
"' Kate Kelly et al., Fed Races to Rescue BearStearns in Bid to Steady FinancialSystem, WALL
ST.J., Mar. 15, 2008, at Al; Roddy Boyd, The Last Days of Bear Stearns, FORTUNE (Mar. 31,
2008), http://money.cnn.com/2008/03/28/magazines/fortune/boydbear.fortune/.
12 Boyd, supra note 127.
'2
On March 13, 2008, the Wall Street Journal ran an article that "reported that
firms were growing cautious about their dealings with Bear." Kelly et al., supra note 127.
'"

Boyd, supra note 127.
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$10 million of Bear Stearns' bonds increased to over $600,000 (it had
been less than $100,000 a year earlier).'
Over the course of the following week, many of the repo
counterparties that ordinarily provided Bear Stearns with short-term
funding did indeed stop trading with it on customary terms, requiring
cash or treasury securities when they had previously been willing to
accept other securities as collateral for repo trades. 12 Because of the
prevailing distrust of Bear Stearns as a counterparty, even those
counterparties that believed that Bear Stearns was fundamentally sound
were put in a difficult position: "[ilf Bear did fail, they would have to
explain to their clients why they ignored the rumors."'3 3 Some repo
counterparties refused to trade with Bear Stearns at all, even if Bear
Stearns offered to post treasury securities as collateral."' This was
effectively a run on Bear Stearns by its repo counterparties, 3 5 of the type
discussed in Part lV.C above. Bear Stearns went into rapid decline, and
within a week an acquisition byJPMorgan Chase was necessary.
In testimony before the U.S. Senate Banking Committee, Bear
Stearns President and CEO Alan Schwartz stated:
Due to the stressed condition of the credit market as a whole and
the unprecedented speed at which rumors and speculation travel
and echo through the modern financial media environment, the
rumors and speculation became a self-fulfilling prophecy. . . . I want
to emphasize that the impetus for the run on Bear Stearns was in
the first instance the result of a lack of confidence, not a lack of
capital or liquidity.
While such a statement from Bear Sterns' former CEO can be read as
self-serving, it appears to be a reasonably correct description of the events

"" GILLIAN TETT, FOOL's GOLD: HOW THE BOLD DREAM OF A SMALL TRIBE ATJ.P.
MORGAN WAS CORRUPTED BY WALL STREET GREED AND UNLEASHED A CATASTROPHE 218
(2009).
Kelly et al., supra note 127.
Id.
CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, sup#ra note 96, at 288.
Kelly et al., supra note 127 (quoting Tim Bond, Barclays Capital Strategist);
Okamoto, supra note 32, at 197. For a more general discussion of runs on repo, see
Gorton & Metrick, Securitized Banking and the Run on Repo, supra note 114.
' The loss of confidence in Bear Stearns by its prime brokerage clients and
derivatives counterparties also contributed to Bear Stearns' downfall. Hedge fund
and institutional clients that used Bear Stearns as a custodian began withdrawing
from their brokerage accounts, depriving Bear Stearns of significant fees and
collateral to rehypothecate. See Kelly et al., supra note 127; Okamoto, supranote 32, at
197. Also, Bear Stearns' derivatives counterparties increasingly became reluctant to
deal with it, depriving it of the fees associated with that business. See FINANCIAL CRISIS
INQUIRY COMM'N, supra note 96, at 287.
13 Statement of Alan Schwartz,
President and C.E.O. of the Bear Stearns

.. FINANCIAL

Companies, Inc., Before the S. Banking Comm. 1 (Apr. 3, 2008).
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of 2008. 'At the beginning of March 2008, Bear Stearns satisfied all of its
regulatory capital requirements, and had a liquidity cushion of
approximately $18 billion."3 Bear Stearns was still able to post the usual
collateral for its repo trades, so its counterparties' refusal to provide the
usual secured funding seems best explained by a loss of confidence in the
collateral itself, a loss of confidence in Bear Stearns as a counterparty, or
a combination of the two.
There was certainly a loss of confidence in the usual collateral for
Bear Stearns' repo trades: Bear Stearns held large quantities of subprime
mortgages in March 2008, and the general decline of the subprime
mortgage market brought into question the quality of those mortgages as
collateral."o However, this does not explain why some repo
counterparties refused to provide any funding to Bear Stearns in March
2008, even when Bear Stearns offered to post ultra-safe treasury securities
as collateral.' In their examination of data from the system-wide run on
repo during the Financial Crisis, economists Gary B. Gorton and Andrew
Metrick concluded that concerns about collateral value alone would not
cause a run on repo. It appears from Gorton and Metrick's research
that a failure of confidence in Bear Stearns as a counterparty was a
precondition to the run on Bear Stearns' repo funding.1
V. THE DESTRUCTION OF CONFIDENCE
The previous Part examined the consequences of a loss of
confidence in a financial institution. Drawing on the experience of the
Financial Crisis, this Part provides a brief background on panic selling,
short selling, and the use of CDSs, and then examines how they
exacerbate a loss of confidence. Part VI then goes on to examine how an
impending coco conversion is likely to prompt such panic selling, short
selling, and the use of CDSs, potentially setting off a funding run.

'" More independent voices have come to similar conclusions. For example,
Professor Steven Schwarcz notes that "Bear Stearns, for example, did not collapse
because of problems with economic fundamentals ... [its mortgage-backed securities
holdings] created fear among its contractual counterparties who then refused to have
further dealings." Schwarcz, supra note 105, at 248 n.345. Even financial institutions
"with enormous positive net worth" can fall into bankruptcy if they lose their ability to
attract counterparties on a daily basis. Okamoto, supra note 32, at 203.

"' FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, supra note 96, at 287.
40 Okamoto, supra note 32, at 197.
"' FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, supra note 96, at 288.
4'
Gorton & Metrick, Securitized Banking and the Run on Repo, supra note 114, at 27.
' In a similar vein, Admati et al. note that "[t]he breakdowns of repo
refinancing for Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers were triggered by asset price
declines, in particular, in these institutions' share prices." Admati et al., supra note 9,
at 34. The reduction in share price is both a manifestation and a cause of a loss of
confidence in an institution.

LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW

150
A.

[Vol. 16:1

PanicSelling

In a rational, efficient market, the prices of securities like shares and
bonds are meant to be a correct reflection of the intrinsic value of those
securities, as deduced from the information available to the market about
the securities themselves, and about the issuers of those securities.'" So
the theory goes, if a rational investor were to receive information about a
particular security or its issuer that shows that the price of the security is
higher than its intrinsic value, then the investor would offer to sell that
security.'" However, in reality, investors sometimes sell for reasons that
do not depend entirely on the intrinsic value of a security or the
exchange of reliable and verifiable information: an emotional reaction to
gossip, the media, and the behavior of other investors can cause investors
to panic and lose confidence in a security or its issuer.'" When an
investor is panicked, the price at which he or she is willing to sell a
security reflects not so much the fundamental underlying value of the
security, but the impetus to get rid of the security.
This too can be explained by reference to prisoner's dilemma
theory.' The sale of a single security will only depress the price of that
security by a small amount, but if a large number of investors seek to sell
the same securities at the same time, then that will cause a large negative
price swing.1 8 The holders of such securities would therefore be best off
if they all refrained from selling their securities, but because securities
holders cannot trust other holders not to sell, if they sense a panic they
will seek to gain an "early-mover advantage" by selling first and getting
the best price possible. This will depress the price of the securities for
other securities holders and inspire further panic and selling, creating a
negative feedback loop. The drop in value for debt instruments
(especially those that are new and thinly traded) is likely to be more
extreme than for equity securities like shares, because there are fewer
potential buyers in the less liquid debt markets.
B. Short Selling
In the simplest terms, being "short" on a stock is equivalent to
wanting the price of that stock to fall. Short selling occurs when a person
sells stock that he or she does not own, or consummates a sale of stock

" This is Eugene Fama's famed "efficient market hypothesis." See, e.g., Eugene F.
Fama, The Behavior of Stock-Market Prices, 38J. Bus. 34, 90 (1965).

" Id. at 38.
'
AKERLOF & SHILLER, supra note 97, at 55-56.
.. Brunnermeier, supra note 124, at 96.
'"

Id. at 92.

Id. at 94. Typically, debt instruments such as cocos are more thinly traded
than equity stocks.
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with stock that he or she has borrowed.10 o A short seller does this in the
hope that by the time the short seller needs to provide the stock to the
buyer to close out the sale, the market price of the stock will have fallen
(thus the seller can acquire equivalent stock for a price that is less than
what the seller sold the stock for)."' A person may sell short in order to
or in order to hedge or offset other exposure that the
speculate,'
investor has. If the short seller is a speculator, then his or her profit will
be the difference between the sale price and the purchase price.
However, if the price of the stock rises and the speculator needs to
liquidate its position, the speculator will need to acquire the stock at that
54
higher price before it can close out the trade, and will make a loss.
For decades, there have been debates about whether short selling
should be permitted,"" but discussions about the merits of short selling

no This is the definition used in Regulation SHO-Regulation of Short Sales, 17
C.F.R. § 242.200(a) (2011), promulgated by the SEC pursuant to the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934,15 U.S.C. § 78w (2006).
m In the United States, short selling of stocks is regulated by the SEC pursuant
to Regulation SHO. Section 242.203 of Regulation SHO prohibits a broker/dealer
from accepting a short sale order unless the broker/dealer has arranged to borrow
the security, or has reasonable grounds to believe that the security can be borrowed
in time to satisfy delivery obligations (this is known as the "locate" requirement).
17 C.F.R. § 242.203 (201t). Section 242.204 of Regulation SHO imposes a "close-out"
requirement (i.e., a requirement to purchase or borrow undelivered shares to close
out trades) with respect to certain securities (known as "threshold securities") for
which there have been extended delivery failures at a clearing agency. 17 C.F.R.
§ 242.204 (2011). Until the close-out requirement has been satisfied, broker-dealers
may not effect a short sale order in the equity securities to which the close-out
requirement relates without having arranged to borrow said securities. See
Amendments to Regulation SHO, 74 Fed. Reg. 38266, 38291-93 (July 31, 2009) (to
be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 242). In the wake of the Financial Crisis, the SEC has
amended section 242.201 of Regulation SHO to introduce a short sale-related circuit
breaker. 17 C.F.R. § 242.201 (2011). This is intended to prevent short sales of
securities that have decreased 10% or more from their closing price at the end of
trading on the previous day. The circuit breaker rule has the potential to limit some
bear raids on financial institutions, although a recent simulation of the short selling
orders placed during September/October 2008 found that Rule 201 would not have
been particularly effective had it been in place during that period. Chinmayjain et
al., Short Selling: The Impact of SEC Rule 201 of 2010, at 1 (Mar. 2011), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract =1718137. Furthermore, section 242.201 will not curb panic
selling. See Amendments to Regulation SHO, 75 Fed. Reg. 11232, 11232, 11323-24
(Mar. 10, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 242).
112

Short Selling, INVESTORGUIDE, http://www.investorguide.com/igu-article-827-

stock-strategies-short-selling.html.
'"5

Id.

15' Id.
1

For a history of public distrust of short selling, see ROBERT SLOAN, DON'T

BLAME THE SHORTS: WHY SHORT SELLERS ARE ALWAYS BLAMED FOR MARKET CRASHES AND

How HISTORY Is REPEATING ITSELF (2010). Essentially, the proponents of short selling
take the view that it provides necessary liquidity to equity markets and market
discipline for equities issuers. Id. at xiii-xiv. The detractors take the view that short
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took on a new urgency during the Financial Crisis. Financial institutions
were blaming short sellers for their failure,'" and the short sellers
countered that the institutions were failing because they were overleveraged and held bad and improperly valued assets."F7 The SEC sided
with the financial institutions, and effective July 21, 2008, it temporarily
banned naked short selling in the securities of a short list of large
financial institutions. 151 On September 18, 2008, the SEC took the
extraordinary step of placing an outright ban on the shorting of stock in
The SEC explained its
a broad range of financial institutions.'

September ban as follows:
[W]e were concerned that false rumors spread by short sellers
regarding financial institutions of significance in the U.S. could
continue to threaten significant market disruption.... [F]alse
runors can lead to a loss of confidence in our markets. Such loss of
confidence can lead to panic selling, which may be further
exacerbated by "naked" short selling. As a result, the prices of
securities may artificially and unnecessarily decline well below the
price level that would have resulted from the normal price

selling artificially depresses the price of securities and creates incentives for market
manipulation. Id. at xvi.

" Richard Fuld, former CEO of Lehman Brothers, testified that "[t]he naked
shorts and rumor mongers succeeded in bringing down Bear Stearns. And I believe that
unsubstantiated rumors in the marketplace caused significant harm to Lehman
Brothers." Statement of Richard S. Fuld, Jr. Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and
Gov't Reform 10 (Oct. 6, 2008). Citigroup CEO Vikram Pandit complained that short
sellers nearly brought down Citigroup. See Nelson D. Schwartz, Those Wall Street Gamblers
Might Not Be Bad After All, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 20, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010
/03/21 /weekinreview/2 1schwartz.html.
'5 William Fleckenstein of Fleckenstein Capital, a short-only hedge fund, stated,
"[flinancial stocks imploded because of the drunkenness with which executives buying
questionable securities levered-up in obscene fashion .... Short sellers didn't do this.
The banks were reckless and they held bad assets. That's the story." Gary Matsumoto,
Naked Short Sales flint Fraud in Bringing Down Lehman, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 19, 2009),
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aBljlqmFOTCA. David
Einhorn of Greenlight Capital gave multiple speeches and interviews during April and
May of 2008 in which he criticized Lehman Brothers' valuation procedures and
announced that Greenlight Capital had a short position in Lehman for that reason. See
LAWRENCE G. McDONALD WITH PATRICK ROBINSON, A COLOSSAL FAILURE OF COMMON
SENSE: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE COLLAPSE OF LEHMAN BROTHERS 286-89 (2009).
' Emergency Order Pursuant to Section 12(k)(2) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 Taking Temporary Action to Respond to Market Developments, 73 Fed.
Reg. 42379 (July 21, 2008).
'" Emergency Order Pursuant to Section 12(k) (2) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 Taking Temporary Action to Respond to Market Developments, 73 Fed. Reg.
55169, 55170-74 (Sept. 18, 2008). No action was taken to suspend the use of CDSs with
respect to financial institutions, because the SEC did not have the authority to regulate

CDSs at that time (nor did the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, which was the
other U.S. regulator with some jurisd iction over derivatives).
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discovery process. If significant financial institutions are involved,
this chain of events can threaten disruption of our markets.'6 0
While many have criticized the September ban and questioned its
efficacy,"'] the SEC's underlying concern was nonetheless valid. Even
though bulk short selling and the spreading of rumors are only likely to
depress stock prices below their fundamental values for a brief period of
time, financial institutions are highly reliant on confidence for the
continuation of their short-term funding, and even a brief depression of
a financial institution's stock price may be sufficient to set off a funding
run.
C. CreditDefault Swaps
A CDS is a derivative instrument that allows the purchaser of the
instrument to buy protection with respect to an underlying debt
instrument (the "reference obligation") . Where the buyer of a CDS has
no interest in the reference obligation, the CDS is referred to as a "naked
CDS."'6 4 The buyer of the CDS pays a fixed premium (also known as the
"spread") to the seller of the CDS over a fixed period in return for a
promise by the seller to pay a fixed amount to the buyer if a "credit
event" (such as a failure to pay, a bankruptcy, or a downgrade by a credit
rating agency) occurs with respect to the "reference entity" that issued
the reference obligation. 6 5 Upon the occurrence of the credit event, the
seller will pay the buyer and the buyer will deliver the reference
obligations to the seller.'66 Alternatively, the parties may agree to settle
the transaction in cash with the seller making a cash payment to the
buyer in the amount of the fixed payout less the then current market
value of the reference obligations.' As such, a CDS buyer only faces a

'" "Naked" Short Selling Anti Fraud Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. 61666, 61668-69 (Oct.
17, 2008) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240).
16 Critics cite the resulting deterioration in market quality and price inflation.
See, e.g., Don M. Autore et al., Short Sale Constraints, Dispersion of Opinion, and Market
Quality: Evidence from the Short Sale Ban on US. Financial Stocks, U.S. SEC. & 7EXCH.
8O9 27-28 (June 2009), http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-08-09/s
COMM'N,
3779.pdf. Also, the September ban had the unintended consequence of effectively
shutting down the convertible bond market.
", For further discussion, see Merrit B. Fox et al., Short Selling and the News: A
PreliminaryReport on an EmpiricalStudy, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 645, 653-54 (2009/10).
1 Kristin N. Johnson,
Things Fall Apart: Regulating the Credit Default Swap
Commons, 82 U. COLO. L. REv. 167, 194 (2011).

Id. at 197.

Id. at 194; Matthew A. Kluchenek & Nicole M. Kuchera, A Credit Default Swaps
Primer: Uses, Mechanics, Benefits, Risks, Regulation, and Developments, 27 J. TAX'N INVS. 3,
5-6 (2009).
'" Kluchenek & Kuchera, supra note 165, at 6.
67 For further detail, see id. at 6; Janis Sarra, FinancialMarket Destabilization and
the Role of Credit Default Swaps: An International Perspective on the SEC's Role Going
Forward,78 U. CIN. L. REv. 629, 631 (2009); Johnson, supra note 163, at 194.
1
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limited risk, being the amount of the spread.' The amount of the spread
is determined by market demand for the CDS (the more demand, the
higher the spread), and the spread is in turn viewed by the market as a
reflection of information about the reference entity."" A higher spread is
seen as an indication that the market thinks a reference entity is more
likely to default. 7
CDSs were first developed in the early 1990s."' CDSs have been
largely unregulated for most of their history, 72 which means that to date
there has been little check on the amount of CDS protection that sellers
in the United States can issue. Multiple CDSs could therefore be issued
with respect to a single reference obligation, exponentially magnifying
the impact of the failure of that reference obligation.'1 When Title VII of
Dodd-Frank becomes fully effective, it may curb the amount of CDSs that
are written in the United States. 7 4 However, CDSs are highly mobile and
CDS issuers need not have a territorial nexus with the reference entity. 7
Dodd-Frank cannot regulate the issuance of CDSs by foreign institutions,
'

GEORGE SOROS, THE CRASH OF 2008 AND WHAT IT MEANS 166 (2008).

Kluchenek & Kuchera, supra note 165, at 6; Gary Gorton, Are Naked Credit
DIGEST, June 4, 2010, available at
http://faculty.som.yale.edu/ garygorton/published-papers.html.
on17 For further discussion of this point, see Gorton, supranote 169.
SOROS, supra note 168, at xviii.
"7 This was part of a conscious decision on the part of financial regulators in the
Default Swaps Too Revealing?, INv. DEALERS'

United

States to

leave

credit derivatives,

and other

over-the-counter

swaps,

unregulated. In his 1998 testimony before the House Committee on Banking and
Financial Services, Alan Greenspan summarized the pre-Financial Crisis laissez-faire
attitude toward over-the-counter swaps: "Aside from safety and soundness regulation
of derivatives dealers under the banking and securities laws, regulation of derivatives
transactions that are privately negotiated by professionals is unnecessary." FINANCIAL
CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, supra note 96, at 47-49.
1 See JOHN GEANAKOPLOS, SOLVING THE PRESENT CRISIS AND MANAGING THE
available at http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu
16
(2009),
LEVERAGE CYCLE
/cdn media/fcic-testimony/2010-0226-Geanakoplos.pdf.
1
A detailed discussion of the impact of Title VII is beyond the scope of this
Article, but it is possible that when the central clearing, exchange trading, and
margin requirements of Title VII becone fully effective, they will limit the amount of
CDSs that are written in the United States. Kristin Johnson argues that the clearing
requirements of Title VII of Dodd-Frank improve information exchange and
transparency, such that "if market participants had been required to clear credit
default swap transactions during the years before the crisis, it is unlikely that AIG
would have entered into such a significant volume of credit default swap agreements
acting as a protection seller without triggering at least an investigation into its
collateral accounting policies and its ability to satisfy obligations under the
agreements." Johnson, supra note 163, at 238. However, there are exemptions from
Dodd-Frank's clearing requirements for CDSs that are highly customized or thinly
traded, or if one of the counterparties is not a "financial entity" and is Using the CDS

to "hedge or mitigate commercial risk." Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 723, 124 Stat. 1376, 1679 (2010). It
remains to be seen if these exemptions will be broadly construed-if so, Dodd-Frank
will do little to limit the amounts of CDSs that are written in the United States.
1'
Sarra, supra note 167, at 650-51.
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even if those CDSs relate to obligations of United States financial
institutions." Therefore, notwithstanding the reforms of Dodd-Frank,
CDSs will continue to be able to be used to multiply the number of
possible bets on the failure of a bank's reference obligations, potentially
damaging confidence in that bank.
D.

The Destruction of Confidence

As the discussion above shows, large volumes of panic selling and
short selling depress the price of the securities being sold, and large
volumes of purchases of CDSs that reference a particular bank increase
the spread on those CDSs. Because the market has limited information
7
and ability to judge the financial condition of banks, CDS spreads and
share prices are some of the most important sources of information
available about a bank. Negative changes in these indicators are likely to
be interpreted by the market as symptomatic of problems with the bank,
178
whether or not the fundamentals of the bank have in fact deteriorated.
In a world of perfect information and rationality, CDS spreads would
only increase and securities prices would only fall for good reason, and
affected banks would respond to this market discipline by taking steps to
remedy the market's concerns, thus restoring share prices and CDS
spreads to previous levels. However, market discipline on financial
institutions is rarely measured and often takes the form of panic and
runs: Admati et al. refer to this as an "inefficient destruction of asset
values." 7 9
If the market perceives that a bank is in trouble, then counterparties
will be wary of providing it with short-term funding without requiring
more and better collateral.1so As the bank finds it more difficult to obtain
8
funding, it will be more likely that it will be rendered insolvent. ' A
change to the narrative about confidence in a financial institution can
thus become a self-fulfilling prophecy, as summarized by George Soros:
[T]he mispricing of financial instruments can affect the
fundamentals that market prices are supposed to reflect. Nowhere
. See generally Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.
" HEIDI MANDANIS SCHOONER & MICHAEL W. TAYLOR, GLOBAL BANK REGULATION:
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES, at xiv (2010).
178 Falling stock prices and increasing CDS spreads may also cause credit rating
agencies like Standard & Poor's and Moody's to downgrade a financial institution's
rating. The markets often view a rating downgrade as confirmation of problems with
the rated institution, which will increase funding costs for that institution, and may
potentially trigger contractual obligations on it to collateralize existing debt.
"1 Admati et al., supra note 9, at 35.
" Runs on the repo market, an important source of short-term funding for
banks, are discussed in more detail in Part IV.C.
.. The Squam Lake Report refers to such an eventuality as a "death spiral."
FRENCH ET AL., supra note 34, at 92-93. The IMF notes that "[m]arkets can be
distorted, especially during times of stress, and therefore fail to provide the right
signals." Pazarbasioglu et al., supranote 4, at 24.
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is this phenomenon more pronounced than in the case of financial
institutions whose ability to do business is so dependent on
confidence and trust. A decline in their share and bond prices can
increase their financing costs. That means 182that bear raids on
financial institutions can be self-validating ....
If financial institutions are forced to close, this creates costs for the
broader economy in the form of restricted credit. These costs are likely
to be much greater than the costs of allowing an insolvent financial
institution to continue to operate for a brief period of time,' 4 so financial
regulation should err on the side of protecting confidence and avoiding
184
runs.
VI. COCOS CAN DRIVE MARKETS CUCKOO
Cocos are currently being promoted by many policymakers,
regulators, and academics as a cheaper, more appealing alternative to
common equity.'18 However, many of those promoting cocos have
disregarded or underestimated the harm that an impending coco trigger
event is likely to do to market confidence in the coco issuer.'8 ' Because
trigger events are low-probability and conversion into equity is such a
fundamental and irreversible change to the coco, the perception that a
trigger event is likely to occur will be enough to cause concern about the
coco issuer. Even if there is no rational basis for this perception, it will
incentivize stakeholders in the coco issuer, as well as speculators, to
engage in panic selling and shorting activity. As discussed in the previous
Part, these types of activities can be further deleterious of confidence in
financial institutions, and that further loss of confidence is likely to
manifest itself in the form of funding shortages for the coco issuer that
will impact its ability to operate as a going concern.
8
'

SOROS, supra note 168, at 167.
Flannery, supra note 17, at 185.

Ronald J. Colombo notes that the restoration of trust and confidence in the
financial markets is a "perennial justification, and a perennial objective" of financial
regulation. Colombo, supra note 90, at 577. While Colombo validly questions the

extent to which regulation can in fact increase confidence in the financial system, this
Article is interested in the inverse of this issue-avoiding regulations that endorse an
instrument that is likely to decreaseconfidence in the financial system.
I See, e.g., FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSION Or EXPERTS, supra note 75, at 6, 25;
FRENCH ET AL., supra note 34, at 86, 138; Pazarbasioglu et al., supra note 4, at 4; PIrr ET
AL., supra note 11, at 1.
1'
For example, the Squam Lake Report takes the position that "the prospect of
a conversion of long-term debt to equity is likely to make short-term creditors and
other counterparties more confident about a bank's future," but neglects to consider
that the conversion could be part of, and reinforce, a general loss of confidence in
the bank. FRENCH ET AL., supra note 34, at 90. The IMF advocates the use of cocos,
even as it concedes that "market perception of a bank's financial condition could be
adversely impacted as bank capital approaches the conversion trigger" and that such
a market perception has the potential to affect the availability of funding for, and
ultimate stability of, such a bank. Pazarbasiogln et al., supra note 4, at 5.
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Cocos start as debt instruments, and convert to equity only upon the
occurrence of a trigger event. While there is little consensus about what
should constitute a trigger event,' all of the proposals discussed in Part
III.B above are similar in that conversion will only be triggered if a lowprobability, high-consequence tail event occurs." The probability is,
then, that cocos will not be converted during their lifetime. Given this
characterization of cocos, it would not be surprising if many buyers of
cocos almost entirely discount the possibility of conversion and expect
only to hold a debt instrument.18 Investors are notoriously likely to
discount the occurrence of tail events.' 90 Coco investors will buy cocos not
because they want to hold equity in the coco issuer, but because they
want to buy debt instruments with a significantly higher yield.'' While
this higher yield should ideally reflect the cost of the risk that cocos will
be converted to equity, such a risk is very difficult to price,192 and as such
the yield is unlikely to be an accurate estimate of the true cost of
conversion to the coco holder. All of this raises the question of how a
coco holder will react in the unlikely event that a conversion trigger
event suddenly appears likely.
Consider a hypothetical investor, Mills Fund, in our hypothetical
Sonny Bank. For illustrative purposes, assume that Sonny Bank has issued
four types of cocos, and Mills Fund has bought significant amounts of
each type:
* Type 1 will convert to equity if the cost of buying a CDS that
references Sonny Bank increases above $X;
* Type 2 will convert to equity if Sonny Bank's stock price
drops below $Y per share;
* Type 3 will convert to equity if Sonny Bank's regulators
determine in their discretion that the cocos should convert
(either because of a system-wide crisis, or because of isolated
problems with Sonny Bank); and

8

188

See supra notes 53-59 and accompanying text.
Id.

19
Investors in hybrid debt-equity securities generally think of them and treat
them as bonds. Humphreys & Pinedo, supra note 10, at 68-69.
190This is a basic tenet of behavioral economics: "[u]nrealistic optimism is a
pervasive feature of human life; it characterizes most people in most social categories.
When they overestimate their personal immunity from harm, people may fail to take
sensible preventative steps." RIcHARD H. THALER & CAss R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE:
IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 33 (2008).
1.1 Logutenkova
& Wille, supra note 73 (citing comments of UBS's Chief
Financial OfficerJohn Cryan).
192 To some extent, the difficulty in pricing stems from the fact that the markets
are not quite sure what to do with cocos yet, given that they are fairly new instruments
and there have been very few issuances to date. There is a more fundamental issue
with coco pricing, though, and that is that trigger events will only occur in lowprobability circumstances, and investors tend to find it difficult to accurately estimate
the risk associated with these kinds of tail events. For a discussion of the difficulty in
estimating tail event risk, see Schwarcz, supranote 105, at 233.
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* Type 4 will convert to equity if the ratio of Sonny Bank's
capital to risk-weighted assets falls below Z:1.
Mills Fund has bought cocos because it wants the certainty of receiving
regularly scheduled repayments of principal and interest from Sonny
Bank. It is not interested in holding Sonny Bank's equity,'" which does
not guarantee any regular payment to Mills Fund. While Mills Fund was
attracted by Sonny Bank's cocos because they pay more interest than
Sonny Bank's regular bonds (because of the risk of conversion), at the
time of purchase, Mills Fund largely discounted the possibility of
conversion.
Unfortunately, Sonny Bank runs into difficulties, and the markets
start to believe that the conversion of Sonny Bank's cocos is suddenly a
lot more probable. Mills Fund hears these rumors, and is concerned
because it does not want to hold equity in Sonny Bank-it therefore tries
to sell the cocos before they convert. To the extent that Mills Fund is able
to sell Sonny Bank cocos when markets lack confidence in Sonny Bank, it
is likely to be panic selling at a discounted price, and the resulting
reduction in the market value of Sonny Bank's cocos could be seen by
the markets as a self-validating indicator of problems with Sonny Bank.
Debt markets are not always particularly liquid, however, and Mills
Fund may have difficulty locating any buyers for the cocos. In the
absence of a liquid market for the cocos, Mills Fund may wish to hedge
its exposure to Sonny Bank. It could do this by shorting the stock of
Sonny Bank'" or by entering into a CDS to hedge the risk of
(This would not be a typical CDS, because the occurrence
conversion.
of a trigger event is not a default under the coco, but it is nonetheless
conceivable that a CDS could be structured such that the occurrence of a
trigger event is considered a "credit event" that requires payment to Mills
Fund under the CDS. Alternatively, a new swap instrument could
evolve-a "credit conversion swap," or "CCS" if you will-which would
behave very much like a CDS except that the obligation of the CCS issuer
to pay Mills Fund would apply upon the conversion of Sonny Bank's
cocos, rather than upon the occurrence of a default.)

'9' Some institutional investors may even be constrained by investment mandates
that do not allow them to hold equity. Pr ET AL., supra note 11, at 10. It may be that,
because of these mandates, institutional investors do not invest in cocos at all.
Alternatively, the institutional investors may consider the chances of conversion to
equity sufficiently remote that they feel comfortable investing in cocos, and plan to
sell off the equity immediately upon the unlikely event of a conversion. The latter
scenario would likely lead to panic selling of financial institution stock at fire sale
prices, damaging confidence in the financial institution and reducing the value of the
bank's capital.
"" See Goodhart, supra note 54.
'" Indeed, the lack of liquidity in the debt markets was the inspiration for the
creation of credit derivatives such as CDSs. Before CDSs were widely used, it was very
difficult to trade credit. Gorton, supra note 169; see alsoJohnson, supra note 163, at 204.
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Mills Fund, while a large holder of Sonny Bank's cocos, is by no
means the only holder of those cocos. If other holders of Sonny Bank's
cocos also do not want to hold Sonny Bank's equity, then they will have
similar incentives, and are thus likely to act in a similar way to Mills Fund.
The more investors that sell Sonny Bank's cocos in a panic, the lower the
market price of a Sonny Bank coco is likely to be driven. When the
markets see that the price of Sonny Bank's cocos is falling, that will
damage market confidence in Sonny Bank. Similarly, the more that
investors short Sonny Bank's stock, the more depressed the stock price
will be, and that will damage confidence in Sonny Bank. If many investors
seek CDS/CCS protection with respect to Sonny Bank's cocos, the price
of CDSs/CCSs will be driven higher. Such an increase in spread will be
interpreted by the markets as an indicator of increased likelihood of the
conversion of Sonny Bank's cocos, and is likely to damage confidence in
Sonny Bank.'9 6
Cocos also create incentives for individuals who do not have any
interest in those cocos: if the conversion of Sonny Bank's cocos into
equity seems likely, existing holders of the common equity in Sonny Bank
will fear dilution of their stock holdings. These stockholders are thus
incentivized to engage in quick sales of their holdings, even if the sales
are at a discount, and further depress the market value of Sonny Bank's
stock. Speculators are also likely to become interested in Sonny Bank
when they witness these types of adverse developments and volatility.
Speculators may be incentivized to short Sonny Bank's stock, as a bet that
Sonny Bank's share price will fall yet further.9 8 Speculators may also
become interested in using naked CDSs/CCSs to place a bet as to
whether it is likely that Sonny Bank's cocos will be converted into equity,
or as a proxy for a bet on the health of Sonny Bank.'99 If numerous
' A CDS spread is viewed by the market as a reflection of information about the
reference entity. A higher spread is seen as an indication that the market thinks a
reference entity is more likely to default. For further discussion of this point, see
Gorton, supra note 169.
1"
"Some counterparties participate in the CDS market to capitalize on the
volatility in credit spreads during times of economic uncertainty." Sarra, supra note
167, at 632. George Soros takes the view that "[p]eople buy [CDSs] not because they
expect an eventual default but because they expect the CDS to appreciate in the case
of adverse developments." SOROS, supra note 168, at 166.
Similar shorting activity could also occur if a "gone-concern" coco were to
l'
approach its conversion trigger. If the coco issuer's stock price were to fall because of
such activity, then the value of the coco issuer's equity would be reduced, leaving less
equity to be applied to the resolution of the coco issuer once it reached the point of
non-viability.
'9 These are likely to present an attractive proposition for speculators, as the
most speculators can lose is the amount of the fixed premia they have agreed to pay,
but their potential gain is unlimited (although speculators are subject to the
counterparty risk that the CDS/CCS seller may not honor its obligation to make
payment under the instrument). See SOROS, supra note 168, at 166. If there is
sufficient demand, many CDSs/CCSs can be issued with respect to a single coco,
effectively multiplying the number of people with incentives to express negative views
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speculators purchase multiple CDSs/CCSs with respect to a single coco,
then that can significantly drive tip the spread on those CDSs/CCSs and
effectively multiply the damage that each coco can cause to confidence in
Sonny Bank.
In a slightly different hypothetical scenario, assume that Mills Fund
(or another holder of Sonny Bank's cocos) has resigned itself to
acquiring equity in Sonny Bank upon conversion. In that case, it will be
faced with a different set of incentives. Particularly if Sonny Bank's cocos
are set to convert to a fixed dollar value's worth of Sonny Bank's shares
(as determined by a contractually set formula), then Mills Fund is
incentivized to short Sonny Bank so as to drive Sonny Bank's share price
downwards: the lower the share price, the more shares Mills Fund will
receive upon conversion... For the same reason, Mills Fund is
incentivized to spread rumors in an attempt to lower Sonny Bank's share
price. Speculators who have purchased a CDS/CCS or shorted the stock
of Sonny Bank (and thus stand to gain if Sonny Bank becomes weaker)
have similar perverse incentives to spread damaging rumors. It is difficult
to obtain data about how much rumor-mongering goes on in the
markets, but many prominent financial regulators are of the view that
rumors caused much damage to financial institutions during the
Financial Crisis.2 While the anti-fraud provisions of the United States
federal securities laws already operate as a ban on market manipulation
through the spreading of rumors,0s these are unlikely to be effective in
203
practice as it is very difficult to identify and prove such cases.

about the coco issuer. Each purchase of a CDS/CCS that references a coco signals to
the market a lack of confidence in the financial institution that issued that coco, and
the more CDSs/CCSs that are issued with respect to a particular coco, the greater the
negative signaling effect. See GEANAKOPLOS, supra note 173, at 16.
FRENCH ETAL., supra note 34, at 56.

The SEC cited the damaging nature of rumors about Bear Stearns as the
impetus for itsJuly 2008 ban on naked short selling of stock of financial institutions.
Emergency Order Pursuant to Section 12(k) (2) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 Taking Temporary Action to Respond to Market Developments, 73 Fed. Reg.
42379, 42379 (uly 21, 2008). Former Treasury Secretary Paulson testified before the
FCIC that he believed that rumors caused significant damage to financial institutions
during the Financial Crisis. Testimony by Henry M. Paulson,Jr. Before the Financial
Crisis Inquiry Commission (May 6, 2010) (author's recollection).
77
212 This power derives from § 17 of the Securities Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C. §
q
(2006)), and from Rule l0b-5 made pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(17 C.F.R. § 240.101-5 (2011)).
o0 "Market-manipulation cases are difficult to prove.... The problem is tracking
down the original source of a rumor and proving that traders knew the information
was false when they told others." Kara Scannell et al., Pressed to Act, SEC to Probe False
Rumors About Market, WALL ST.J., July 14, 2008, at Cl. In a rare case where the SEC
was able to trace a false rumor back to a short seller, the promulgation of the rumor
caused an entity's share price to drop by 17% in half an hour. Complaint at 1-2, SEC
v. Berliner, No. 08-CV-3859JES (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 2008).
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Sonny Bank's Type 1 and Type 2 cocos have market-based triggers
and are particularly susceptible to manipulative behaviors.o4 This is
because short sellers and holders of CDSs/CCSs stand to gain if
conversion occurs, and are in a position to bring about conversion by
engaging in abusive shorting activity and spreading rumors that depress
Sonny Bank's share price below the trigger level (in the case of Type 2
cocos) or raise its CDS/CCS spread above the trigger level (in the case of
Type 1 cocos).20s
Cocos with non-market-based triggers have the potential to damage
confidence in slightly different ways. For example, if the cocos are Type 3
with a discretionary trigger, it is less certain whether and when a trigger
206
event will be called. While this means that there is less scope for market
207
the uncertainty about how the
manipulators to force a conversion,
regulator will act also provides fodder for panic, rumors, and speculation.
With a Type 4 coco, there are again fewer incentives for market
manipulation, 20 s but a capital-based trigger is subject to accounting
manipulation by the coco issuer.20 For example, Sonny Bank could move
assets off its balance sheet at the end of the quarter so that it does not
have to report them, only to buy back those assets at the very beginning
of the next quarter: in this way, Sonny Bank can make its capital ratio
look much more attractive. The capital ratio is also a lagging indicator of
Sonny Bank's capital position, because capital ratios are only calculated
and disclosed at fixed intervals rather than on an ongoing basis.210
Because of the paucity of accurate, real-time information available
regarding Sonny Bank's capital position, holders of Type 4 cocos are
likely to pay particular attention to changes in the popular narrative
about the coco issuer. Falling stock prices and rising CDS spreads will

204 The IMF notes that a disadvantage of using market-based triggers is that
"[p]rice manipulation (via short-selling) and the self-fulfilling threat of equity
dilution could inflict a confidence-induced downward spiral that eventually triggers
conversion." Pazarbasioglu et al., supra note 4, at 24. The IMF also notes that with
market-based triggers, there is a higher chance of "premature conversions, which
lead [to] higher funding cost." Id.; see also, PITr ET AL., supra note 11, at 6; FRENCH ET
AL., supra note 34, at 91.
20o As discussed in Part V.B., the SEC's new circuit-breaker rule may make a
precipitous fall in share price less likely, but the circuit-breaker rule cannot stop a
panic sale by existing stockholders, nor would it affect the purchase of CDSs/CCSs.
200 Pazarbasioglu et al., supra note 4, at 25.
20

Id.

200

PITT ET AL., supra note 11, at 6.

It became clear after the Financial Crisis that several investment banks had
been using accounting techniques to manage their balance sheets. For example,
Lehman Brothers used a technique known as "Repo 105" to temporarily move assets
off its balance sheet immediately prior to the end of each reporting period. Similarly,
Bear Stearns would sell assets at the end of each quarter and repurchase them at the
beginning of the next quarter, in order to improve its quarter-end leverage ratio.
FINANcIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, supra note 96, at 177, 281.
210Pazarbasioglu et al., supranote 4, at 24.
20"
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seem like some of the only reliable information available to holders of
Type 3 and 4 cocos.
Like most banks, Sonny Bank is likely to be highly reliant on shortterm ftnding sources for financing its day-to-day operations and longerterm investments. As discussed in Part IV, a significant loss of confidence
in Sonny Bank is likely to manifest itself in the form of runs on Sonny
Bank's short-term funding (it matters little whether the market
perception of Sonny Bank's condition is correct or not). For example, if
repo market participants cease to see Sonny Bank as a confidence-worthy
counterparty, then they will start to require more and better collateral for
short-term funding, or may cease to provide that funding entirely. If
Sonny Bank cannot obtain funding for an extended period of time
because of a lack of market confidence, any illusory difficulties that
Sonny Bank was facing suddenly will become concrete: Sonny Bank will
be unable to operate and may fail (or require a bailout). Prior to any
such failure, it is likely that Sonny Bank's share price will drop further
and CDS spread will rise. This makes conversion of Sonny Bank's Type 1
and 2 cocos more likely. With Type 3 cocos, the loss of liquidity caused by
the funding run may force the regulator to declare a trigger event for
Sonny Bank, notwithstanding that the institution otherwise appears
solvent. The markets' concerns about the occurrence of a trigger event
may thus become a self-fulfilling prophecy.
If the trigger event does occur, the psychological impact of that
event may be so damaging to confidence in Sonny Bank that even the
recapitalization provided by the cocos is insufficient to restore that
confidence.' While the Squam Lake Report takes the view that the
prospect of conversion and recapitalization is likely to make short-term
creditors more confident about a bank's future, if such recapitalization
occurs in an environment of falling stock prices and increasing CDS
spreads, the confidence boost provided by recapitalization is likely to be
negated " If the funding run continues after recapitalization, the
amount of capital that Sonny Bank has received from the recapitalization
will not enable it to continue to operate for very long. In short, the
specter of the trigger event will have damaged confidence in Sonny Bank,
and the capital inflow following the trigger event will have failed to
restore that confidence, essentially rendering the cocos ineffective as
going-concern regulatory capital.
This Part has so far focused on the ability of cocos to damage
confidence in an individual financial institution, Sonny Bank. However, a

2
Contingent
Capital:
CoCo
Nuts,
ECONOMIsT
(Nov.
5,
2009),
http://www.economist.com/ node/14816673.
'2 FRENCH ET AL., supra
note 34, at 90.
2 " The Swiss Commission of Experts has noted that "confidence
is key" inl
enabling a bank to continue to operate as a going concern, even if the bank has been
recapitalized by the conversion of cocos. FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF
EXPERTS, supra note 75, at 25.
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loss of confidence in one bank that has issued cocos can have
implications for other banks. Economist Charles Goodhart has noted two
potential spillovers that are likely to occur: first, if other financial
institutions have invested in Sonny Bank's cocos, their investments will
lose value and their exposure to Sonny Bank will increase upon the
conversion of those cocos. 2 In this way, the interconnectedness of
financial institutions is enhanced, increasing the likelihood of
transmission of risk through the financial system. Second, if Sonny
Bank's cocos convert, then that is likely to make the markets generally
nervous about the conversion of cocos issued by other banks (even if
there is no evidence that those banks are in trouble), potentially
encouraging market-wide shorting of coco issuers as well as panicked sell215
offs of cocos that would destroy their value. National governments may
be tempted to avoid such a transmission of risk through the system by
bailing out coco issuers and/or holders prior to a conversion. Cocos
may therefore increase the likelihood of bailouts, even though avoiding
the need for bailouts is one of the key reasons for having going-concern
regulatory capital requirements in the first place. If cocos cause
difficulties for significant and/or multiple financial institutions, then the
availability of credit to individuals, businesses, and local governments is
also likely to be reduced.2 " As the Financial Crisis has shown, failure of
significant financial institutions and credit crunches can lead to general
economic tightening, and such tightening can result in broader costs to
society at large in the form of poverty and unemployment.m
VII. EQUITY OVER COCOS
Much of Part VI is conjecture, albeit conjecture informed by the
experience of the Financial Crisis, about what might happen when a coco
trigger event occurs, or appears to be near. However, in estimating worstcase scenarios (which are the very scenarios that cocos are intended to
address), conjecture is sometimes the best tool available to regulators.
Given the uncertainties regarding the operation of cocos, and the
likelihood that they will incentivize behaviors that have the potential to
damage both confidence in and the viability of the very financial
institutions that the cocos were intended to bolster, the use of cocos to
satisfy going-concern regulatory capital requirements is not a very
attractive proposition. Cocos are primarily being promoted as an
alternative to common equity because they are assumed to be less costly

" Goodhart, supranote 54.
211
211

Admati et al., supra note 9, at 55.
SeeBrunnermeier, supra note 124, at 90.

"' Schwarcz, supra note 105, at 207.
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for the banks that issue them, as well as for society at large.' This
assumption is often taken as an article of faith, but an important new
Stanford University working paper (the Working Paper) challenges this
224)
assumption.
The most commonly cited reason for why equity is more expensive
than debt is that many national taxation systems effectively subsidize
debt.2 2 ' However, as the Working Paper notes, tax incentives for debt are
not an inevitability, but a conscious policy choice. Rather than opening
society tip to the potentially negative consequences of cocos, it is open to
national governments to institute tax subsidies for common equity used
as regulatory capital so that it costs the same as debt. Equity is also
thought to be more expensive than debt because equity holders are
subject to more risk than debt holders, and thus it is presumed that they
will demand a consistently higher return. 2 However, the Working Paper
points out that the risk to equity holders is not a constant-to the extent
that a bank reduces its risk profile by holding more common equity, the
return on equity required by investors will be lower.2 2' The gap between
the premium on equity and the premium on debt could therefore be
narrowed by deleveraging the financial institution. In any event, because
cocos are subject to the risk of conversion and are therefore more
expensive than ordinary debt, the gap between the premium on equity
and the premium on cocos will be narrower than the gap between the
premium on equity and the premium on ordinary debt. The discrepancy
between equity and coco costs is therefore less pronounced.
When considering the statement "equity is expensive," it is important
to ask the question, "for whom is equity expensive?" Are we concerned
that higher common equity requirements are going to be costly for the
shareholders and managers of banks, or for society at large? If we are
concerned with shareholders and managers of banks, then it is most
likely correct to say that equity is more expensive than debt, at least for
large and systemically important banks.' This is in large part due to the

"" Financial institutions are thought to be particularly sensitive to discrepancies
between the cost of funding sources because the "most important competitive edge
that banks bring to bear for many types of transactions is the ability to fund
themselves cheaply." Hanson et al., supra note 15, at 20.
22' Admati et al., supra note 9, passim.
2'
Id., at 20-21. As noted in Part III.C above, the Swiss have agreed to allow cocos
to be taxed like debt. It remains to be seen whether other jurisdictions will afford
cocos the same treatment.

Id.
Id. at 17.
Id. Federal Reserve Board Governor Dennis K. Tarullo recently made a similar
point. See Dennis K. Tarullo, Governor, Fed. Res. Sys., Regulating Systemically
223

Important Financial Firms, Speech at the Peter G. Peterson Institute for International
Economics (June 3, 2011), available at http://vwww.federalreserve.gov/newsevents
/speech/tarullo20110603a.htm.
2

Admati et al., supra note 9, at 21.
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implicit guarantee of government assistance for large banks in times of
crisis-governments are unlikely to let such institutions fail, so their
creditors are less worried about a default and this translates into low
interest rates for bank debt."' Effectively, the implicit government
guarantee subsidizes the cost of bank debt and leads banks to believe that
they will not need to internalize all of their losses. Bank managers
therefore are incentivized to use leverage to multiply their profit in good
times, notwithstanding that the loss to a leveraged bank in bad times will
227
also be multiplied. From a social policy perspective, such incentives for
leverage are undesirable.2 2" Forcing banks to reduce leverage and fund
themselves with more equity is therefore desirable, unless doing so is
likely to impose other costs on society at large.
Some argue that replacing bank debt financing with equity financing
is socially undesirable because holders of bank debt (including coco
holders) are thought to impose more market discipline on banks than
An increase in equity funding at the
bank equity holders impose.
expense of debt is therefore thought to reduce the amount of market
policing of bank management, and increase the chance of that bank
acting imprudently and potentially threatening the stability of the
financial system."o However, uniformity of interest for debtholders
cannot be assumed-to the extent that some debtholders have purchased
CDS protection or shorted the stock of the issuing bank, they will no
longer be incentivized to exert pressure on mana ement to act
prudently.21 In fact, they may prefer to see the bank fail.2 Further, there
is little evidence of debt holders actually exerting any market discipline
in the run up to the Financial Crisis. 32 As discussed in Part IV.D above,
when "market discipline" was finally applied to Bear Stearns, it was not
measured and resulted in panicked funding runs that did not so much
discipline as destroy the institution. It therefore seems that if regulators
insist on equity over cocos, any resulting reduction in market discipline is
unlikely to be overly costly to society.
The most powerful and pervasive argument against increased equity
capital requirements seems to be that if banks are required to fund
themselves with more expensive equity vis-A-vis cheaper cocos or other
debt, then the banks will be forced to reduce their lending, thus harming
the broader economy." However, the Working Paper notes that
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Id. at 22.

22 Id.

id.
Id. at 27.
230 For further discussion of this issue,
see id. at 27-36.
231 Sarra, supra note
167, at 637.
232 Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, Equity and Debt Decoupling
and Empty VotingIl:
Importanceand Extensions, 156 U. PA. L. REv. 625, 731 (2008).
233 Admati et al., supra
note 9, at 30.
231 Id. at 43; see also Prrr ET AL., supra
note 11, at 12.
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requiring banks to hold more equity in proportion to their risk-weighted
assets does not automatically lead to a reduction in lending-financial
regulators and institutions have choices about how equity capital ratios
are managed, and instead of reducing the denominator of the ratio by
reducing assets such as loans, financial institutions could comply with
heightened equity capital ratios by increasing the numerator of the ratio
by issuing new equity. However, notwithstanding that an increase in
equity capital requirements will not force banks to restrict lending,
absent a regulatory directive to issue new equity, banks may choose to
satisfy such increased requirements by restricting lending. The Working
Paper suggests that, to the extent that increased equity capital
requirements do reduce lending, they may curtail overly risky loans by
banks: not all lending is socially desirable,s' and increased capital
requirements may shift bank preferences toward making more prudent
loans.

2371

The Working Paper concludes that while banks have incentives to
favor debt financing over equity (in the form of taxation subsidies and
implicit government guarantees), leverage has socially undesirable
consequences for systemic stability, and increased equity capital
requirements would not be overly costly for society at large :
Because the social benefits of significantly reducing bank leverage
are significant, and because there are no significant social costs of
increasing equity requirements for banks, politicians and regulators
should not be overly concerned with threats that credit markets will
be adversely affected by increasing equity requirements. High
equity requirements need not interfere with any of the valuable
intermediation activities undertaken by banks. Regulators should
therefore take steps to impose significantly higher equity
requirements as quickly as possible.
In sum, while the Working Paper goes against the conventional
wisdom, it is very persuasive in its assertion that debt is not inherently
cheaper for society than equity. Given the uncertainties surrounding the
operation of cocos and the potential damage that they can cause, it
makes more sense to abandon cocos as a form of going-concern
regulatory capital, and instead require financial institutions to simply
hold more common equity: "[w]ith equity there is no need to go through
the process of mandatory conversion, and the potentially problematic
process and uncertainties leading up to the actual conversion are
avoided.",2111

" Admati et al., supra note 9, at 43.
Tarllo, supra note 224.
2
Admati et al., supra note 9, at 47.
2." Id. at 56-57.
21 Id. at
57.
25
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Id. at 54-55.
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VIII. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
There is a clear consensus that regulatory capital requirements are
important for financial stability, and that common equity is the best and
211
most loss-absorbent form of capital. Support for cocos as going-concern
capital is a product of the belief that common equity is more expensive
than debt, as well as the belief that allowing financial institutions to use
cocos to satisfy regulatory capital requirements will improve their ability
to lend to the broader economy. However, these beliefs have recently
been challenged, and if the notion that "equity is expensive for society"
cannot withstand scrutiny, then the touted benefits of cocos as an
alternative to equity are illusory.
Even if equity is more expensive for society than debt, the use of
cocos should give us pause: in a crisis situation, cocos have the potential
to incentivize trading strategies that destabilize confidence in the very
financial institutions that cocos are intended to help. At the very least,
regulators should not encourage the use of financial instruments that are
likely to damage confidence in financial institutions. Capital
requirements should therefore be satisfied with larger common equity
capital cushions, rather than cocos: larger equity cushions are much
more likely to bolster certainty and confidence in the financial
institutions that hold them. To the extent that increased equity capital
requirements do actually impact socially beneficial lending, regulators
may wish to change the tax treatment of common equity regulatory
capital in order to realign its cost with debt.

.4.See supra notes 15-39 and accompanying text (regulatory capital requirements
are important); and supra notes 219-40 and accompanying text (equity is the best
form of capital).

